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UNWRAPPING RACIAL HARASSMENT
LAW
Pat K. Chew and Robert E. Kelley
Abstract
This article is based on a pioneering empirical study of racial harassment in the
workplace in which we statistically analyze federal court opinions from 1976 to
2002. Part I offers an overview of racial harassment law and research, noting its
common origin with and its close dependence upon sexual harassment legal ju-
risprudence. In order to put the study’s analysis in context, Part I describes the
dispute resolution process from which racial harassment cases arise.
Parts II and III present a clear picture of how racial harassment law has played
out in the courts—who are the plaintiffs and defendants, the nature of the claims,
who wins and loses, and what factors affect those outcomes. We consider dozens
of characteristics of the parties, the nature of the harassment, and litigation char-
acteristics (such as the forum, type of proceedings, and legal issues). While it re-
veals that individuals in all kinds of occupations, in all parts of the country, of all
races, and of both genders complain about racial harassment—it also shows that
African Americans are disproportionately likely to be plaintiffs. While Whites
are the most likely harassers, minority individuals also are defendants. The data
also discloses that the most typical legal proceeding is the court’s consideration
of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment where the judges end up termi-
nating most plaintiffs’ cases. In fact, the judicial opinions in this study find in the
plaintiffs’ favor only 21.5% of the time. (In contrast, an earlier study revealed that
judges in sexual harassment cases find in the plaintiffs’ favor 48% of the time –
more than twice as often as in racial harassment cases.) As it turns out in racial
harassment cases, the race of the plaintiff and of the alleged harasser makes a dif-
ference in the parties’ success rates, but the gender of the plaintiff does not. Judges
are a bit more likely to find racial harassment when plaintiffs allege blatant racist
behavior rather than more subtle and contextual racism. Results vary depending
on the location of the case. Part IV provides an integrated analysis of the data,
including a look at how racial harassment litigation has evolved over time. It also
offers explanations and implications of the study’s results.
This article contributes detailed baseline data for litigants, judges, and legislators.
Each group can draw upon the totality of racial harassment cases to guide their
decisionmaking. The article also offers a sound basis for creating a new racial
harassment jurisprudence that should be distinct from both sexual harassment and
racial discrimination jurisprudence.
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1UNWRAPPING RACIAL HARASSMENT LAW
Part I:  Introduction 
 
Rogers v. EEOC1 is widely cited as the first case to recognize an employer’s 
hostile working environment as a form of illegal discrimination in general, and of racial 
harassment in particular.2 Since this 1971 landmark case, however, very little systematic 
assessment of racial harassment case law has occurred.  This article and the empirical 
study on which it is based begin to fill this void in scholarship.  They offer a window into 
racial harassment law and, subsequently, into actual racial harassment practices in the 
workplace. 
 
Much of American society, particularly White Americans, imagines that racial 
discrimination and harassment are no longer prevalent in the workplace.3 When racial 
discrimination or harassment do occur, they are perceived as out of the ordinary, perhaps 
perpetrated by an uneducated and unsophisticated boss in an isolated industry or part of 
the country where such socially antiquated behavior is tolerated.  A common assumption 
is that blatant racist insults, such as using racial epithets or the flaunting of nooses, no 
longer occur—and in the rare instances in which they do, judges and juries certainly 
would conclude that they are illegal. 
 
Despite these societal beliefs that the workplace is not racist, evidence to the 
contrary is mounting.4 Racial harassment is a particular form of racism and of 
 
1 Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). 
2 While the plaintiff in the Rogers case based her lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Rogers case and subsequent cases under Title VII have also been applied to cases under Sections 1981 and 
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
3 See, e.g., JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, & FUTURE REPARATIONS 
123-24 (2000) (citing various surveys of White Americans including those on job discrimination) 
[hereinafter FEAGIN]; Adam Goodheart, The New America:  A Change of Heart, AARP MAG., May/June 
2004, at 43-49, 82 (survey indicating that majority of Whites deny persistent discrimination against 
minorities); HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH, LAWERENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL 
ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 166-67 (1997) (survey showing that three-
quarters of Whites reject the proposition that Blacks face workplace barriers). See also infra discussion 
accompanying notes 63-65 (describing contrasting perceptions of White Americans with other racial and 
ethnic groups). 
4 Research documents all kinds of racial discrimination in the workplace, including racial harassment.  See,
e.g., Aaron Bernstein, Racism in the Workplace, BUS. WK., July 30, 2001, at 64-67 (noting patterns of 
racial harassment in the workplace); Alfred Blumrosen & Ruth Blumrosen, The National Report:  The 
Reality of Intentional Job Discrimination in Metropolitan America, available at http://www.EE01.com
(revealing a widespread pattern of “intentional” discrimination, which is defined as underutilization of 
minorities or women at more than two standard deviations below the standard of utilization within an 
industry with the inference that such underutilization cannot be explained by chance or because of a lack of 
available candidates) [hereinafter Blumrosen & Blumrosen]; Catalyst, Women of Color in Corporate 
Management:  Three Years Later, available at http://catalystwomen.org. (reporting a decline in 
opportunities for minority women to reach senior management roles); and Marianne Bertrand & Sendhi 
Mullainanthan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?  A Field Experiment on 
Labor Market Discrimination, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. w9873 (July 2003), available at 
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2harassment5 which occurs when individuals are intimidated, insulted, bullied, excessively 
monitored or otherwise harassed because of their race.  Racial harassment occurs in a 
range of settings, including in the workplace.6 This research study notably reveals a more 
complex and sometimes dramatically different picture than American society imagines. 
 
Unlike traditional legal analysis where authors build their arguments with a few 
carefully selected and persuasive leading cases, this empirical study follows a different 
process and serves a different purpose.7 It methodically studies hundreds of randomly-
selected representative judicial opinions and then draws well-reasoned inferences from a 
statistical analysis of these cases.  The purpose is to provide a carefully documented 
survey and analysis of the facts, issues, and holdings of racial harassment cases.  Rather 
than reviewing the facts, legal principles, and judicial reasoning with an advocacy 
position in mind, this study analyzed each case and gathered information on each variable 
as objectively, validly, and reliably as possible.8 Empirical research thus tests our 
 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w98973 (their findings suggesting that either employers are prejudiced or 
employers perceive that race signals different productivity levels:  (1) job applicants with White names 
needed to send about 10 resumes to get one callback, but those with African American names needed to 
send around 15 resumes to get one callback; and (2) Whites with higher quality resumes received 30% 
more callbacks than Whites with lower quality resumes, but the positive impact of a better resume for those 
with African-American names was much smaller). 
5 Employees of course can be harassed and treated in an uncivil manner on the basis of attributes other than 
race.  See, e.g., CHARLOTTE RAYNER, HELGE HOEL & CARY L. COOPER, WORKPLACE BULLYING: WHAT 
WE KNOW, WHO IS TO BLAME, AND WHAT CAN WE DO? (2002); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of 
“Workplace Bullying” and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 
475 (2002); GIOVINELLA GONTHIER, RUDE AWAKENINGS: OVERCOMING THE CIVILITY CRISIS IN THE 
WORKPLACE (2002); SETH ALLCORN, ANGER IN THE WORKPLACE: UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF 
AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE (1994).  Harassment also occurs in settings other than work.  See ROBIN M. 
KOWALSKI, COMPLAINING, TEASING, AND OTHER ANNOYING BEHAVIORS (2003).  As an illustration of the 
occurrence of racial harassment in a non-work setting, consider Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy 
of Immigration, Intellectual Property, and Racial Harassment:  Case Studies of the Implementation of 
Legal Changes on Campus, 63 J. HIGHER EDUC. 570-598 (1992) (describing racial harassment of students 
on college campuses). 
6 As examples of social science research and discussions on racial harassment in the workplace, see Edward 
J. Harrick & George M. Sullivan, Racial Harassment:  Case Characteristics and Employer 
Responsibilities, 8 EMPLOYEE RESP. AND RTS. J. 81 (1995); Kimberly T. Schneider, Robert T. Hitlan & 
Radhakrishnana Phanikiran, An Examination of the Nature and Correlates of Ethnic Harassment 
Experiences in Multiple Contexts, 85 J. APPLIED PSCYHOL. 3 (2000) [hereinafter Schneider]; FEAGIN, supra 
note 3, at 164-66; and Sunner Shin & Brian H. Kleiner, The Psychological Effects of Working in a Racially 
Hostile Environment, 21 INT’L J. OF SOC. AND SOC. POL’Y 59 (2001). 
7 For an excellent resource that explains empirical research and methodology, including its possible 
application and prior misapplication to legal topics, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).  See also Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructure for Empirical 
Research in the Law, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2003); Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Analysis,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980); and MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 71-202 (Rebecca M. Blank, 
Marilyn Dabady & Constance F. Citro eds., 2004). 
8 Much of the information compiled on each case in this study is objective.  For instance, information on 
the litigation process, such as the judicial district and state in which the lawsuit was litigated, are all 
objectively determined.  Much of each case opinion, however, is essentially that particular judge’s narrative 
of the events.  While judges may quite consciously and in good faith attempt to be objective, every judge 
views disputes through his or her own cultural lens.  See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, “The Pervasiveness of Culture 
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3assumptions about the law and the social paradigm in which we frame and interpret the 
legal principles.9
Part I offers an overview of racial harassment law and research, noting its 
common origin with and its close dependence upon sexual harassment legal 
jurisprudence.  Attributable in part to its dependence on sexual harassment jurisprudence, 
development of racial harassment jurisprudence has been limited.  Part I continues with 
an explanation of the dispute resolution process and the legal proceedings from which 
racial harassment cases arise. 
 
Part II begins in earnest discussing the findings of the empirical study which is the 
focus of this article.  An interdisciplinary team of legal, social science, and business 
researchers designed and implemented the research methodology for this study.  We 
began by identifying all reported federal district court and appellate judicial opinions 
 
in Conflict,” 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 60 (2004) (discussing, for instance, how judges in racial harassment cases 
view the facts through their own cultural lens).  Hence, some inherent shifting and sifting of the 
information occurs as judges make sense of the dispute and apply the legal principles to the specific case.  
In addition to the natural bias any person would have, the judge must justify his or her judgment.  As 
described by Professors Juliano and Schwab, “The cynical legal realist might say that the facts the judge 
chooses to relate are inherently selective and a biased subset of the actual facts of the case.  This is an 
overstatement, but it is instructive.”  Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548 (2001) [hereinafter Juliano & Schwab]. 
9 Basing an empirical study on published opinions also has certain limitations.  As we will discuss, some 
individuals believe they are racially harassed but do not file formal complaints nor do they bring lawsuits.  
Even disputes involving employees who do file formal charges with the EEOC and then ultimately engage 
in litigation are not all captured in these reported cases.  See infra discussion accompanying notes 81-122.  
Hence, while this study of cases provides valuable insights into racial harassment litigation and racial 
harassment in the workplace—it remains a proxy. 
 Traditional legal scholarship of course is subject to these same caveats since it also focuses on 
published opinions written by judges.  This empirical study offers some advantages over traditional legal 
scholarship.  In describing their empirical study of sexual harassment cases, Professors Juliano and Schwab 
explain:  “In broadening the traditional analytical legal approach, we have foregone the ability to examine 
the nuances of particular cases and doctrinal debates among judges.  However, we have gained perspective 
on the bulk of the issues and fact patterns with which federal judges wrestle . . . This sweep of cases, then, 
presents a particularly important perspective.”  Juliano & Schwab, supra note 8, at 553-54.  It is 
purposefully a more representative depiction of racial harassment cases than the traditional approach of 
citing and analyzing only a handful of “leading” cases that are purposefully selected to support a particular 
legal or policy proposition. 
 For examples of empirical research in employment law, see Juliano & Schwab, supra note 8; 
Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal 
Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab]; Kevin M. Clermont, 
Theodore Eisenberg, & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547 (2003); Blumrosen & Blumrosen, supra note 4; 
Vicki Shultz & Stephen Peterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice:  An Empirical Study of the Lack of 
Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992); David 
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter:  An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination 
and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 511 (2003); and Kathryn Moss, Scott Burris, Michael Ullman, Matthew Johnsen & Jeffrey 
Swanson, Unfunded Mandate:  An Empirical Study of the Implementation of the American with Disabilities 
Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 KAN. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
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4where the plaintiffs brought racial harassment claims under the major federal statutes for 
harassment claims in the workplace in six federal judicial circuits through 2002 (“the 
racial harassment cases”).10 These circuits represent different geographical regions and 
include large states with ethnically diverse populations.  Through this method, 625 cases 
were identified.  (Thus, an estimate of all reported federal cases on racial harassment 
would be 1250 cases.11) Given this universe of 625 cases, a social science “rule of 
thumb” would recommend a sampling of at least 10-15% of these cases.  We exceeded 
this recommended percentage by drawing 260 cases, representing 40% of all cases, in a 
stratified random sampling within each circuit.  The first case in our study occurred in 
1976.  Thus, the study covers cases spanning 26 years.12 
Each of the 260 cases in this study was independently read and analyzed by at 
least two individuals.13 We coded the information onto a “case profile” form that 
carefully collected over 100 discrete pieces of information for each case.  Then, we 
statistically analyzed this information in various ways.  Processes included (where 
appropriate) frequencies, percentages, averages, correlations, and regressions.  In 
addition, qualitative observations of the court’s analysis also were compiled. 
 
10 This study analyzes published judicial opinions.  While a particular legal dispute could have multiple 
judicial proceedings and judicial opinions, the disputes in this study typically only had a single judicial 
proceeding and judicial opinion.  Thus, the authors opted to use the more conventional term of “cases” 
throughout this article although the study technically studies judicial opinions.  See also Juliano & Schwab, 
supra note 8 (also using the term “case” to describe judicial opinions). 
 The search terms were “(rac! w/3 haras!) & ((title vii) or (42 w/5 1981 or 1983)” in the 
LEXIS/NEXIS and WESTLAW data bases for all cases in the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh federal circuits through 2002.  This search resulted in reported cases brought in these federal 
circuits at either the district courts or the appellate courts with racial harassment claims based on Title VII 
or Sections 1981 or 1983.  While we subsequently discuss the case characteristics in detail, a brief 
summary here is helpful.  Approximately 80% of the cases in the study are district court cases; 20% are 
appellate court cases.  Of the district court cases, about 96% are either motions for summary judgments, 
motions for dismissals, or bench trial on the merits.  The appellate court cases are reviews of district court 
motions for summary judgment, bench trials, or jury trials.  Many of the cases included other claims.  For 
example, 13.5% of these racial harassment cases also include a sexual harassment claim.  Judicial opinions 
dealing with claims of racial harassment based only on state law analogs to Title VII or dealing with Title 
VII claims pursued only in state courts are not included in this study. 
11 The number of federal racial harassment cases in the six federal circuits in this study is 625 cases.  Since 
there are twelve federal circuits (excluding the Federal Court of Appeals), an estimate of the number of 
cases in all circuits would be 1,250 cases (assuming the remaining six circuits are comparable to those in 
this study). 
12 For the five years after the Rogers case in 1971, supra note 1, there apparently were few if any other 
racial harassment cases. 
13 After a period of training on how to collect and analyze the cases, at least one research assistant read 
every case.  In addition, Professor Chew read every case.  There were detailed coding instructions for each 
variable.  Professor Chew’s and the research assistants’ readings of the case were done independently, and 
the results were then compared as a cross-check for reliability.  If there was a difference in the information 
gathered on any case, Professor Chew reviewed the case again to confirm that the information was correct.  
Professor Chew or a graduate student in statistics and economics then inputted the information onto an 
Excel spreadsheet.  The statistical packages SPSS and EXCEL were used for performing the various 
statistical analyses.  The statistical analysis was supervised by Professor Kelley in consultation with 
Professor Chew. 
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5Part II offers an analysis of racial harassment law, as based on a detailed analysis 
of the cases in this empirical study.  It begins by describing the individuals and 
companies that are involved—both those who claim they were harassed and those they 
accused of harassing them—thus personalizing the characters and settings in which 
harassment occurs.14 Part II continues with an exploration of the acts of harassment.  It 
describes how alleged harassers use words, conduct, and their decision-making authority 
to create a hostile working environment.15 This discussion then focuses on myriad 
characteristics of the litigation process itself:  the forum, type of proceedings, plaintiffs’ 
claims, and legal issues.16 
This analysis of racial harassment cases indicates, for instance, that employees in 
all kinds of occupations complain about harassment in all parts of the country and in all 
types of companies.  Blacks are the most likely plaintiffs, but there are also Asian, 
Hispanic, and White plaintiffs as well.  Whites are the most likely harassers, but minority 
individuals are also defendants.  Harassment involving multiple harassers including both 
supervisors and co-workers is not unusual, suggesting that racial harassment may be 
more socially tolerated than we acknowledge.  There are also revelations about the 
litigation process. For instance, while most lay people assume that racial harassment 
judicial opinions describe trials on the merits of a plaintiff’s racial harassment claim, this 
study indicates that trials are unusual.  The cases deal more typically with defendants’ 
pretrial motions for summary judgments, which defendants hope will stall or end 
plaintiffs’ cases. 
 
Part III moves the empirical analysis a further step by focusing on the outcome of 
the proceedings in these judicial opinions.  Each case was coded as a “win” for the party 
whose legal position is favored by the court.  Thus, an “employee/plaintiff win” means 
that the outcome of the legal proceeding described in the judicial opinion is in the 
plaintiff’s favor; an “employer/defendant win” means the outcome is in the defendant’s 
favor; and “both the employee/plaintiff and employer/defendant win” means the outcome 
is in part in the defendant’s favor and in part in the plaintiff’s favor.17 Given that a 
substantial majority of the cases are employers’ motions for summary judgment, a 
“plaintiff win” in these cases means that the motion is denied and a “defendant win” 
means that the motion is granted.  Given the legal effect of the court’s decision on a 
motion for summary judgment, the outcome of these proceedings is often dispositive.18 
14 See infra discussion accompanying notes 123-40. 
15 See infra discussion accompanying notes 141-50. 
16 See infra discussion accompanying notes 151-87. 
17 In 5.38% of the cases, both the plaintiff and the defendant had a favorable outcome on some portion of 
the motion or different motions related to the racial harassment claim.  In these cases, both the plaintiff and 
the defendant are credited with a “win.”  Hence, the cumulative percentage of “plaintiff wins” and 
“defendant wins” exceeds 100%. 
18 See infra discussion accompanying notes 110-22. 
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6Part III begins with grim news for prospective plaintiffs and heartening news for 
defendants.  Plaintiffs are successful in only 21.5% of the cases analyzed in this study. 19 
Part III considers how the different characteristics of racial harassment cases, as 
described in detail in Part II, affect the outcome of the cases.20 Many interesting patterns 
appear.  For example, Part III reveals that the race of the plaintiff and of the defendant 
makes a difference in the plaintiffs’ success rate, but the gender of the plaintiff does not.  
The nature of the harassment does not seem to alter outcomes significantly, although 
judges are a bit more likely to find racial harassment when there is blatant and egregious 
racist conduct rather than more subtle and contextual racism.  Plaintiffs are particularly 
likely to lose both their arguments that the harassment was “severe or pervasive” and 
“because of race,” and the defendants’ pretrial motions for summary judgment.21 
Therefore, judges are not only the gatekeepers but they typically keep plaintiffs out, 
stopping them from pursuing their litigation any further.  Plaintiffs also fare differently 
among federal circuits and states.22 In addition, our study suggests that plaintiffs in racial 
harassment cases are more likely than plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases to fare 
poorly.23 
Thus, the extensive empirical study described in this article provides rich data on 
racial harassment case law and breaks new ground.  Prior to this study, employees, 
employers, judges, lawyers, and academics could only speculate on the characteristics 
and outcomes of racial harassment cases.  Part IV offers an integrated analysis and 
discussion of the study results and provides a baseline for creating a racial harassment 
jurisprudence.24 
A.  Racial Harassment Law and Research
1.  Rogers as the Beginning of the Harassment Doctrine
An unlikely fact pattern, a novel Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) theory, and an independent thinking jurist in Rogers v. EEOC25 led to the birth 
of the hostile environment doctrine.  The rarely-told story begins in 1969, when 
Mrs. Josephine Chavez filed a charge with the EEOC against her employer.  The 
 
19 See infra discussion accompanying notes 188-89. 
20 See infra discussion accompanying notes 190-219. 
21 See infra discussion accompanying notes 41-48 (describing these elements of a racial harassment case). 
22 See infra discussion accompanying notes 199-202. 
23 In sexual harassment cases, plaintiffs win in 48.2% of the cases (51.2% of the district court cases and 
39% of the appellate court cases).  Juliano & Schwab, supra note 8, at 596.  In contrast, plaintiffs in racial 
harassment cases win in only 21.5% of the cases (20.8% of the district court cases and 24.5% of the 
appellate court cases).  Hence, plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases are more than twice as likely to win 
their case as plaintiffs in racial harassment cases. 
24 See infra discussion accompanying notes 220-32. 
25 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). 
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7employer were brothers S.J. and N. Jay Rogers doing business as “Texas State Optical” 
in Beaumont, Texas.  Mrs. Chavez’s charge stated in full:26 
“The above company has discriminated against me because 
of my national origin Spanish surnamed American [sic] by: 
 
a.  Terminated me from my job without a reason.  I 
was the only Spanish surnamed American employed with 
seven Caucasian females who abused me.  The manager 
told me my work was allright [sic] but he had to let me go 
because of friction. 
 
b.  segregating the patients.” 
 
After frustrating and unsuccessful efforts to get the optometrists to voluntary 
produce office records, the EEOC issued a Demand for Access to Evidence.  In 
particular, the EEOC wanted documents purportedly showing that the optometrists’ 
employees color-coded customers’ office forms by race—using red ink or red pencil for 
Black customers’ “applications for service” and blue or black ink or pencil for non-Black 
customers.  These records presumably would support Mrs. Chavez’s charge that the 
business segregated patients by race.  Given that Mrs. Chavez was bringing an employee 
discrimination claim on her own behalf, Rogers argued that the demand for this 
information about patient treatment was overbroad.  The EEOC countered with the novel 
theory that the segregation of patients, “though not directed against Mrs. Chavez, could 
‘create an atmosphere that would adversely affect the terms and conditions of her 
employment’ and thus have an effect that is proscribed by Title VII.”27 Thus, the legal 
issue before the district and appellate courts was whether information about a business’s 
discriminatory treatment of its customers was a reasonably relevant request in 
investigating an employee’s own charge of racial discrimination.28 
The novelty of the EEOC’s theory is evidenced by district court Judge Fisher’s 
perfunctory rejection of it. 
 
Accepting arguendo the Commission’s contention that if 
Petitioners in fact ‘segregated the patients’ then such a 
practice might be so offensive to Mrs. Chavez’s 
sensibilities as to make her uncomfortable in her job, there 
still is no showing that she is ‘aggrieved’ in the sense 
contemplated by [Title VII].  . . . The Commission’s 
contention in the case at bar that an employee can claim the 
protection of Title VII because of the employer’s 
 
26 454 F.2d at 236. 
27 316 F. Supp. at 425. 
28 The district court expressly declined to determine the merits of the underlying controversy.  316 F. Supp. 
422, 424 (E.D. Tex. 1970). 
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authority.  We reject it.29 
The appellate court similarly found the theory controversial.  Of the three Fifth 
Circuit judges, one jurist, Judge Rooney, flatly rejected the EEOC’s theory, concluding: 
 
The question of whether or not the relationship between an 
employee and his working environment is of such 
significance that it ought to be cloaked with statutory 
protection as an employment practice is a question for 
Congress, not for the EEOC, and not for us.30 
The second jurist, Judge Godbold, was able to support the EEOC’s demand for evidence 
(and thereby provide a majority for the EEOC) only by reconstructing the facts in a way 
that allowed him to avoid the EEOC theory altogether.  In his concurring opinion, Judge 
Godbold accepted an alternative construction of the facts offered by the EEOC in its 
appellate brief:  that Mrs. Chavez, because of her ethnic status as a “Spanish surnamed 
American,” was required by her employers to attend to or have contact with only 
segregated patients.31 By construing the facts in this way, Judge Godbold was able to 
find a direct link between the employers’ actions and the employee’s claim of 
discrimination.  He eliminated the need to consider a bold new theory based on less 
tangible arguments about a discriminatory work environment: 
 
This strikes me as a much sounder judicial approach than 
construing the charge as asserting a type of discrimination 
indirect and collateral, pursuant to which Mrs. Chavez was 
offended by segregation practices directed against others 
who are of another ethnic group, and who are not 
employees, and directed at such others because of their 
race, national origin, etc.32 
The third jurist, Judge Goldberg, instead interpreted the charge (as did the district 
court) of segregating of the patients but not including an allegation of Mrs. Chavez being 
required to have contact with only segregated patients.33 Thus, he decided to 
acknowledge the EEOC’s theory and use it as an opportunity to elaborate: 
 
While the district court may have viewed lightly the 
connection between the petitioners’ alleged discrimination 
 
29 316 F. Supp. at 425. 
30 454 F.2d at 245. 
31 As Justice Rooney in his dissenting opinion pointed out, this construction of the facts appeared incorrect.  
454 F.2d at 243. 
32 454 F.2d at 242. 
33 454 F.2d at 237, 239. 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art22
9against its patients and Mrs. Chavez’s sensibilities, I think 
that the relationship between an employee and his [or her] 
working environment is of such significance as to be 
entitled to statutory protection.34 
Writing the majority opinion, he noted that Congress intended Title VII to be liberally 
and flexibly interpreted to achieve its anti-discriminatory purposes: 
 
I regard this broad-gauged innovative legislation as a 
charter of principles which are to be elucidated and 
explicated by experience, time, and expertise.  Therefore, it 
is my belief that employees’ psychological as well as 
economic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from 
employer abuse, and that the phrase “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment” in Section 703 is an expansive 
concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the 
practice of creating a working environment heavily charged 
with ethnic or racial discrimination.35 
Although never using the terms “harassment” or “hostile environment,” Judge Goldberg 
began to delineate the scope of racial harassment jurisprudence.  He articulated language 
that has been frequently cited in subsequent cases: 
 
I do not wish to be interpreted as holding that an 
employer’s mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet 
which engenders offensive feelings in an employee falls 
within the proscription of Section 703.  But by the same 
token I am simply not willing to hold that a discriminatory 
atmosphere could under no set of circumstances ever 
constitute an unlawful employment practice.  One can 
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted 
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional 
and psychological stability of minority group workers, and 
I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the 
eradication of such noxious practices.36 
34 454 F.2d at 237-38. 
35 454 F.2d at 238.  Rogers argued that the charge alleged discrimination against the employers’ patients 
but not toward any employees and that therefore, Mrs. Chavez could not personally claim discriminatory 
treatment.  Judge Goldberg rejected Rogers’ argument.  Noting support from the then recent Supreme Court 
case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), Judge Goldberg explained that Title VII is also 
aimed at consequences and effects of an employment practice even in the absence of evidence of 
discriminatory motivation.  Id. 
36 Id. 
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2.  Limited Development of Racial Harassment Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,37 among numerous other 
courts, describes Rogers as “apparently the first case to recognize a cause of action based 
upon a discriminatory work environment.”  Though the doctrine of discriminatory 
harassment originated with this landmark racial harassment case in 1971, the 
development of key legal constructs and jurisprudence in discriminatory harassment 
subsequently focused on sexual harassment. 
 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Catherine MacKinnon in her 1979 book, 
Sexual Harassment of Working Women:  A Case of Sex Discrimination,38 the conceptual 
debates and evolving models of harassment jurisprudence have been set in the context of 
sexual harassment.39 For instance, important work by Katherine Franke, Kathryn 
Abrams, Anita Bernstein, Vicki Shultz, Teresa Beiner and others, all discussing sexual 
harassment, subsequently received scholarly recognition.40 This research was in part 
prompted by five major Supreme Court cases in harassment law, again all dealing with 
 
37 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  The Meritor court cited the Rogers case with approval, although it erroneously 
described the facts as a Hispanic complainant charging that her employer created an offensive work 
environment for employees by giving discriminatory service to its “Hispanic” clientele.  The correct facts, 
as just described, involved an Hispanic employee plaintiff and the optometrists’ Black clientele.  It is 
unclear how to explain this inadvertent but interesting factual error.  Was it merely an error in transcription 
or, in the alternative, was it a “Freudian slip” because the judges found it too unconventional or dissonant 
that one minority group might be personally distressed over the treatment of another minority group? 
38 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION (1979).  MacKinnon’s work, along with pioneering cases such as Williams v. Saxbe, 413 
F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) and Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), began to crack the 
judicial consciousness that sexual harassment of women at work is illegal sexual discrimination.  
MacKinnon’s work brought attention to long-time abuses of women in all kinds of jobs and industries and 
linked them to legal remedies.  She envisioned sexual harassment as a male supervisor or coworker using 
sexual demands or sex-linked conduct to victimize a female employee.  She also articulated two major 
forms of sexual harassment:  (1) quid pro quo harassment defined by the more or less explicit exchange of 
a woman’s forced sexual compliance for an employment benefit, and (2) condition of work harassment in 
which sex-linked conduct makes the work environment unbearable.  Id. at 32-46. 
39 A review of major legal casebooks on employment discrimination, for instance, indicates that casebook 
authors use sexual harassment cases and discussion almost exclusively to explain harassment jurisprudence 
under Title VII.  See, e.g., SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 365-97 (2000); and ROBERT BELTON, DIANNE 
AVERY, MARIA L. ONTIVEROS & ROBERTO L. CORRADA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 440-540 (7th ed. 2004) (but recently expanding 
coverage to include 10 pages on racial harassment cases out of 100 pages on the harassment jurisprudence 
generally). 
40 See Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997); 
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Anita 
Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997); Vicki Shultz, 
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998); Teresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide:  
The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
791 (2002).  See also Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment:  A Guide to the Literature, 4




sexual harassment fact patterns.  These scholars analyzed and often criticized the 
Supreme Court’s and other courts’ theoretical grounding of sexual harassment claims.  
This quintet of cases—Meritor, Harris, Oncale, Burlington and Faragher—have been 
integral to the emerging legal framework for discriminatory harassment. 
 
Meritor in 1986 was the first Supreme Court case to recognize sexual harassment 
as a form of sex discrimination, noting that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is 
not limited to “economic” or “tangible” discrimination.41 As Justice Rehnquist wrote, the 
phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment evinces a congressional intent ‘to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.”  
Thus, when the workplace is permeated with “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 
insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 
employment and create an abusive working environment,” Title VII is violated.42 The 
Court added, however, that the plaintiff must by her conduct demonstrate that the 
harassment was “unwelcome.” 
 
Harris v. Forklift in 1994 clarified the elements of a hostile environment claim 
under Title VII, including the critical requirement that the harassment must be 
sufficiently “severe or pervasive to alter the work environment.”43 Justice O’Connor 
noted that relevant factors include “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”  It also held 
that the severe or pervasive requirement must satisfy both an objective and a subjective 
standard:44 “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively 
hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would 
find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.  Likewise, if the victim does not 
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered 
the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”45 
Furthermore, she explained that these determinations should be made in consideration of 
“all the circumstances,” rather than focusing on any one factor.46 In addressing whether 
proof that the employer’s conduct seriously injured the psychological well-being was 
required, the court held that psychological harm may be relevant but not determinative. 
 
41 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  See also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognized as the first 
case to endorse the hostile work environment theory of sexual harassment). 
42 477 U.S. at 64-67. 
43 510 U.S. 17 (1993).  Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (earlier articulated 
the elements in a harassment claim:  (1) that the employee belong to a protected class; (2) that the employee 
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the 
harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) that the doctrine of respondeat 
superior applies). 
44 510 U.S. at 370. 
45 Id. 
46 510 U.S. at 371. 
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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services in 1998 explored the evolving conception 
of sexual harassment by considering another critical issue in harassment cases:  whether 
the harassment was “because of sex.”47 This element looks for a motivational link 
between the employer’s conduct and the employee’s protected status.  Holding that same-
sex harassment may be actionable under Title VII, the Court acknowledged factual 
variations from the heterosexual paradigm originally envisioned by Catherine 
MacKinnon were possible.  Justice Scalia also emphasized the relevance of the “social 
context” in which the conduct occurs, including factors such as the status of the 
employee, the nature of the job, and the specific locale of the enterprise.48 
Finally, the twin cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth49 and Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton50 in 1998 offered guidelines on employer liability.  These cases 
announced that employers would be held vicariously liable for their supervisors’ 
unlawful harassment of employees if such harassment resulted in “tangible employment 
action” such as a denial of promotion or a firing.51 However, if the harassment did not 
culminate in tangible employment action (such as significant changes in employment 
status), employers had an affirmative defense if they made reasonable efforts to prevent 
and address the harassment and if employees unreasonably failed to take advantage of the 
employers’ efforts. 
 
Despite the origin of these legal principles in sexual harassment fact patterns, the 
courts and the EEOC presumptively assume that they apply to racial harassment. 52 
Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion in Harris, explicitly analogized the legal 
standards for sexual and racial harassment.53 The prominence of the Harris case, 
moreover, in racial harassment jurisprudence is substantiated by its omnipresent citing in 
racial harassment cases.54 
Social science and empirical research on harassment in the workplace also have 
focused more on sexual harassment than on racial harassment.55 In part, the comparative 
 
47 523 U.S. at 75. 
48 523 U.S. at 83. 
49 524 U.S. at 742. 
50 524 U.S. at 775. 
51 524 U.S. at 809; 524 U.S. 759.  The Faragher/Ellerth cases, however, only provide the standard for 
supervisor harassment.  The “knew or should have known and failed to take prompt corrective action” 
standard still apparently applies to coworker harassment. 
52 EEOC Compliance Manual par. 3116; see, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1 (2003) (providing that legal 
principles originating in sexual harassment cases apply to other types of harassment cases, including 
harassment based on race, color, religion, or national origin). 
53 510 U.S. at 24. 
54 In a Westlaw search of most cited cases in racial harassment caselaw on Sept. 24, 2004 (search of West 
Key “Civil Rights (78k1147) Hostile environment”  with addition of “race or racially or racial”), the Harris 
case was cited 1,000 times, while the Rogers case was cited only 164 times. 
55 JSTOR (available online at http://www.jstor.org.com) is an electronic database that contains the full text 




lack of research on racial harassment is attributable to our still emerging understanding of 
what racial harassment is.  For instance, previous research has not clearly differentiated 
between racial harassment and racial discrimination, so the causes, characteristics and 
consequences of the two are confounded.56 Likewise, the differences between racial 
harassment and other types of harassment, such as sexual harassment, as well as the 
intersection between racial harassment and other types of harassment, are just beginning 
to be recognized and understood.57 
Our understanding about racial harassment is further complicated because there 
are different forms of racial harassment, including verbal racial harassment, physical 
forms of harassment directed at a racial group, and exclusion from work-related or social 
interactions because of one’s race.58 This treatment can be blatantly racist, where the 
harasser manifests overt hostility and animosity toward those of other races.59 In the 
alternative, racism can take other forms that are more subtle, indirect, and covert.60 
JSTOR on Sept. 24, 2004 (search of West Key “Civil Rights (78k1147) Hostile environment”  with 
addition of “race or racially or racial”), produced 121 matches; in contrast, a search for articles on “sexual 
harassment” produced 1,037 matches. 
56 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 6, at 3-12.  Schneider and her coauthors note that social science research 
has not clearly distinguished between fundamental concepts such as racial/ethnic discrimination versus 
racial/ethnic harassment, or between racial/ethnic harassment versus sexual harassment.  Attempting to add 
some clarity, they define racial/ethnic discrimination and racial/ethnic harassment in the following ways.  
Racial/ethnic discrimination is defined as unequal treatment because of one’s race or ethnicity, and is 
conceptualized as a structural or institutional variable.  Racial/ethnic harassment in the workplace has two 
parts:  (i) slurs or derogatory comments about a target’s group, and (ii) exclusion of the target from work-
related or social interactions as a result of the target’s ethnicity or race. 
 Legal scholars also have not sorted out all the differences between racial discrimination and racial 
harassment.  For instance, Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis:  The Case of Constructive 
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 309 n.8 (2004), identifies four basic frameworks of Title VII liability:  
individual disparate treatment, systemic disparate treatment, disparate impact, and harassment.  
Harassment, she argues, has sufficiently distinctive elements to classify it separately, although the courts 
technically regard it as a variation of individual disparate treatment. 
57 See infra discussion accompanying note 72. 
58 See Schneider, supra note 6. 
59 See, e.g., FEAGIN, supra note 2. 
60 A great deal of research and commentary on the topic of subtle discrimination exists.  See, e.g., Charles 
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317 (1987); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) [hereinafter Krieger]; 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench:  Models of Gender Bias in Social 
Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, J. SOC. ISSUES 835-48 (2004); Tristan K. Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:  Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003) [hereinafter Green]; Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working 
Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati]; Terry Smith, Everyday 
Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003); 
Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!:  Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 415, 421-33 (2003); John Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice:  The Third 
Wave, 57 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 829-49 (2001); and Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy:  Situational Racism and Self-
Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1022-35 (2003). 
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These latter forms of racism, sometimes called “aversive racism,” can also be 
unconscious and unintentional.  Linda Hamilton Krieger, for instance, points to a number 
of cognitive processes that are unintentional but nevertheless result in biased employment 
decisions and conduct.61 In addition, aversive racism has substantial negative effects on 
the performance of both the targeted individuals and their work groups.62 
We also are at the early stages of sorting out the perceptions of and the effects on 
different racial groups.  Social science research indicates that racial groups perceive 
differently whether their organizational environment is racist.63 In particular, it shows 
that ethnic minorities are more likely than Whites to conclude that minorities have been 
treated unfairly.64 Perhaps these differences in perception are largely attributable to 
minorities recognizing aversive racism and Whites not recognizing it.  In a similar vein, a 
study by Gutierres, Saenz, and Green65 found that, while individuals of all racial and 
ethnic backgrounds have greater job stress when they perceive high levels of 
discrimination against women and minorities, important differences among racial groups 
exists.  For example, Hispanics who perceive high levels of workplace discrimination 
report more health problems than those who perceive low levels of discrimination.  
Among White participants, in contrast, perceived discrimination was not related to health. 
 
61 See Krieger, supra note 60. 
62 See Green, supra note 60; and Carbado & Gulati, supra note 60. 
63 A range of social science research indicates that Americans of different racial backgrounds perceive the 
workplace differently.  See, e.g., K.A. Dixon, Duke Storen, & Carl E. Van Horn, A Workplace Divided:  
How Americans View Discrimination and Race on the Job (2002), available at http://www.heidrich.
rutgers.edu (joint project with Center for Survey Research and Analysis, University of Connecticut and 
John J. Heidrich Center) [hereinafter Dixon et al.].  Based on a survey of 1,005 workers, the researchers 
concluded: 
Race is the most significant determinate in how people perceive and experience 
discrimination in the workplace . . . more so than income and education.  White workers 
are far more likely than minority workers to believe that everyone is treated fairly at 
work.  For instance, half of African-American workers believe that African Americans 
are treated unfairly, compared to 10% of white workers.  22% of Hispanic-Americans 
believe that (and) Hispanic-American workers are much more likely to believe that they 
are treated unfairly in the workplace than workers of other racial backgrounds. 
Id. at 1, 8. 
 Also see generally RACIAL ATTITUDES IN THE 1990S (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin eds., 
1997); HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH, LAWRENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL ATTITUDES 
IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 250-78 (1997); Christopher P. Parker, Boris B. Baltes & Neil 
D. Christiansen, Support for Affirmative Action, Justice Perceptions, and Work Attitudes:  A Study of 
Gender and Racial-Ethnic Group Differences, 82(3) J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 376-89 (1997); FEAGIN, supra 
note 2, at 126-28. 
64 See Dixon et al., supra note 63. 
65 S.E. Gutierres, D.S. Saenz & B.L. Green, Job Stress and Health Outcomes Among White and Hispanic 
Employees:  A Test of the Person-Environment Fit Model, in JOB STRESS IN A CHANGING WORKFORCE:





Thus, while racial harassment is pervasive and while racial harassment litigation 
is prevalent, comparatively little scholarship on racial harassment jurisprudence has 
surfaced.66 While considerable academic discourse exists on the varied ways to 
conceptualize sexual harassment and sexual harassment jurisprudence, not one major 
legal article exists to conceptualize racial harassment as a unique social phenomenon and 
harm deserving its own jurisprudential framework. 
 
Law review articles on racial harassment instead tend to be more narrow in focus, 
often emphasizing a particular case, work context or jurisdiction.67 Or scholarship has 
focused on how racial harassment can be analogized to or considered part of the 
discourse on sexual harassment and sexual harassment laws.68 Admirable work by 
Camille Hebert and Tanya Kateri Hernández exemplify this.  Professor Hebert confirms 
that courts routinely analogize sexual harassment laws and racial harassment laws to each 
other.69 Moreover, she criticizes the importation of overly strict standards for sexual 
harassment into the law of racial harassment, arguing that racial harassment claims 
should not be saddled with some of the same hurdles as sexual harassment. 70 Positing 
that there is more societal recognition of obvious racial harassment, she proposes instead 
 
66 A literature search on Sept. 24, 2004 of all U.S. law reviews and journals for the term “racial 
harassment” at least 10 times in the article on LEXIS/NEXIS resulted in 57 items.  In contrast, an identical 
search for the term “sexual harassment” resulted in 1,640 items. 
67 See, e.g., Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me “Bitch” Just Don’t Use the “N-word”:  Some Thought on 
Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v. Western Southern Life Insurance 
Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (1997); Phoebe Weaver Williams, Performing in a Racially Hostile 
Environment, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 287 (1996); and Carol MacKenzie, The Second Circuit Review—
1985-1986 Term:  Constitutional Law:  Jailhouse Rocked:  The Second Circuit Confronts a Racially 
Hostile Work Environment in a Correctional Facility: Snell v. Suffolk County, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 357 
(1987). 
68 See, e.g., L. Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 819 (1997) [hereinafter Herbert]; Tanya Kateri Hernández, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity:  
The Mutual Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183 (2001) [hereinafter 
Hernández]; Tanya Kateri Hernández, Gender, Race, and Sexuality:  Historical Themes and Emerging 
Issues in Women’s Rights Law:  The Next Challenge in Sexual Harassment Reform:  Racial Disparity, 23 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 227 (2002); and Virginia W. Wei, Note, Asian Women and Employment 
Discrimination:  Using Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of 
Race, Gender, and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV. 771 (1996). 
 For examples of social science research where both racial and sexual harassment are considered, 
see Audrey J. Murrell, Sexual Harassment and Women of Color:  Issues, Challenges, and Future Direction,
in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: PERSPECTIVES, FRONTIERS, AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES 51 
(Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 1996); and Nicole T. Buchanan & Alayne J. Ormerod, Racialized Sexual 
Harassment in the Lives of African American Women, in VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF BLACK WOMEN:
BATTERED BLACK AND BLUE 107 (Carolyn M. West ed., 2002). 
69 Hebert, supra note 68, at 32-33. 
70 Id. (suggesting that the stringent requirements of sexual harassment laws, such as those articulated in 
Meritor, would not be deemed applicable to racial harassment cases).  This study suggests instead that 
courts do not allow lower standards of proof in racial harassment cases.  See infra discussion accompanying 
notes 217-18.  Hence, while courts may use very egregious behavior as the threshold requirement for 
“severe or pervasive” sexual harassment, as Professor Hebert suggests, they appear to require at least the 
same and more likely a higher level of egregiousness for “severe or pervasive” racial harassment. 
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that courts and society should generalize from their recognition of racial harassment and 
be more cognizant of “obvious” sexual harassment.71 Professor Hernández particularly 
considers issues that arise when we consider the intersection of race and sex in the 
harassment context.  In one provocative piece, for example, she queries why women of 
color are over-represented among those who file sexual harassment charges with the 
EEOC.  She suggests that minority women are disproportionately targeted not just for 
sexual harassment, but also as targets of a combined, cumulative harassment that is based 
both on race and sex in ways that are intersectional and not just additive.72 
While building on “what we know” about sexual harassment is a useful place to 
begin, it has diverted our attention from the inquiry into whether a novel legal or social 
perspective on racial harassment that is not linked in any way to sexual harassment is 
necessary.  Although some parallel issues exist, other issues seem more apropo to one or 
the other form of harassment.73 Despite the important and impressive work on sexual 
harassment laws, it cannot substitute for work on racial harassment laws.74 
B.  Dispute Resolution Process for Racial Harassment Claims
The empirical study, which is the focus of this article, analyzes federal judicial 
opinions.  As important contextual information, we now explain the dispute resolution 
process and the legal proceedings from which these opinions arise.  This background 
information helps explain the study’s findings which we will subsequently discuss. 
 In fact, by the time these racial harassment cases come before a federal district 
court or appellate court, the aggrieved employee, accused employer, and accused harasser 
have already been part of a complex dispute resolution process.  We can graphically 
 
71 Hebert, supra note 68, at 33. 
72 Hernández, supra note 68, at 183.  Furthermore, many minority women are in the lowest playing jobs 
with little prospect for advancement (for instance, in agricultural, domestic services, and low-level 
assembly) and thus particularly vulnerable to harassment by their supervisors. 
73 As an example, the plaintiff’s demonstration that the harassment was “unwelcome” has become a critical 
issue in sexual harassment cases.  The requirement has opened the door to controversial scrutiny of the 
plaintiff’s conduct (her dress, joking, flirtating, and past behavior).  In contrast, in racial harassment cases, 
the plaintiff’s “unwelcomeness” of racial harassment is rarely an issue.  On the other hand, the requirement 
that the harassment is “because of sex” is infrequently an obstacle in heterosexual sexual harassment cases.  
In contrast, whether the harassment is “because of race” is a frequent issue in racial harassment cases.  See 
infra discussion accompanying notes 176-93.  The comparative emphasis on “quid pro quo” harassment 
offers another example.  We can more readily imagine a supervisor coercing a women employee into 
unwanted sexual activity with the threat of being fired than a supervisor coercing a Black woman into 
accepting racial debasement with the threat of being fired.  See infra note 97. 
74 There is the same need for the discrete exploration of other forms of harassment, such as harassment on 
the basis of age, religion, or disability that may have been inadvertently overshadowed by the dominance of 
research on sexual harassment.  Assuming that other forms of harassment, such as racial harassment, are 
indistinguishable from sexual harassment threatens to obscure and belittle the importance of these other 
forms of harassment and discrimination.  At the same time, sexual harassment and sexual harassment 
jurisprudence continue to be important and evolving areas for legal and social science research.  The 





depict the process as a funnel, where you begin with a very large number of racial 
harassment incidents (or at least employees’ perceptions of such) at the wide end of the 
funnel.75 Every published case begins with an employee believing he or she was racially 
harassed.76 (See Figure 1.)  As employees move through the various stages of the dispute 
resolution process, the number of cases declines.77 Ultimately, only a small percentage of 
the original incidents are litigated, and even a smaller number are then reported in 
opinions.78 To illustrate, over 56,000 racial harassment charges were filed with the 
EEOC between 1980 and 1999 (as further described below).79 In contrast, our study 
estimates 735 judicial opinions on racial harassment during approximately that same time 
period, which amounts to only 1.3% of the charges.80 Since not all individuals who 
believe they have been harassed bring an EEOC charge, the percentage of those who 
believe they have been harassed and ultimately have their case published is even smaller. 
 
1.  Process Overview
Any time during the dispute resolution process (up to the time of final judicial 
resolution), the parties may negotiate a settlement or participate in some ADR process. 81 
Some employees drop out at every stage of the process and simply never resolve their 
racial harassment claim through a private, administrative, or judicial proceeding. 
 
75 The general dispute resolution process has been described in various ways.  See, e.g., William L.F. 
Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:  Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 631, 635-36 (1981); and David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 72, 86-87 (1993). 
76 Even before this point, the employee must overcome social-psychological forces that discourage people 
(women and persons of color especially) from acknowledging to themselves that they have experienced 
discrimination.  See infra discussion accompanying notes 85-87. 
77 As Professor Pether reveals, federal judges determine (often on the basis of ad hoc criteria) which of their 
opinions are released to publishers (i.e., West and LEXIS) and these publishers then edit out (on the basis 
of various policies) opinions for the Federal Reporter system and for posting on their websites.  Penelope 
Pether, Inequitable Injunctions:  The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 
1465-74 (2004) [hereinafter Pether].  See also Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg 
from Its Tip:  A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1144-45 (1990) (finding that 80-90% of employment discrimination cases filed in 
federal court do not produce a published opinion). 
78 See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:  What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think 
We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 26-27 (1983) 
(indicating that the settlement rate for cases is very high).  In addition, some employees may pursue their 
racial harassment claims only in state courts under state or federal laws. 
79 See infra discussion accompanying notes 82-84. 
80 This study included 147 cases during this period.  Given that this represents 40% of six federal circuits, 
an estimate of judicial opinions in all circuits in this period would be 735.  See supra note 11.  In addition, 
some of those who filed charges during this period may still be awaiting a judicial resolution. 
81 Almost 70% of employment discrimination cases are terminated by settlement.  Clermont & Schwab, 
supra note 9, at 11-12, 29. 
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(a) Employee Perceives Racial Harassment. Racial discrimination and racial 
harassment in the workplace occur much more often than we might think.  Surveys 
confirm that a substantial number of African Americans and other minority groups 
believe that they are treated differently and disadvantageously.82 EEOC statistics 
indicate, for instance, that racial harassment claims are numerically substantial and on the 
rise.83 Between 1980-1989, the EEOC reports there were 9,757 racial harassment 
charges.  In the following decade of 1990-1999, the number of racial harassment charges 
jumped over 480% to 47,175.84 
For a variety of reasons, however, some employees who believe they are harassed 
do not take further steps.85 They may fear retaliation by their supervisors or co-workers, 
or they may believe that complaining would be ineffective.  They may not know of 
organizational resources or the employer’s grievance procedures.  Cultural explanations 
may also play a role.86 Asian Americans, for instance, may choose to ignore the problem 
rather than confront those they believe are harassing them.  Other minorities may choose 
 
82 See supra note 63. 
83 Trends in Harassment Charges Filed with the EEOC During the 1980s and 1990s, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harassment.html. 
84 National origin harassment charges had similarly dramatic increases.  In 1980-1989, there were 2,289 
national origin harassment charges between 1980-1989 and 15,148 charges between 1990-1999.  Id. 
85 See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 8, at 552 n.9 (citing various studies that explore why women do not 
file sexual harassment claims). 
86 Individuals from different cultural backgrounds approach conflict differently.  Hazel Rose Markus & 
Leah R. Lin, Conflictways:  Cultural Diversity in the Meanings and Practices of Conflict, in CULTURAL 
DIVIDES 302-33 (Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller eds., 1999) (describing dispute resolution styles of 
racial and ethnic American groups).  While not necessarily indicative of any given individual’s behavior, 
Chinese Americans tend to avoid conflict and confrontation, opting instead to preserve the harmony of the 
group.  Id. at 316-21.  Both Chinese-Americans and Mexican-Americans are sensitive to the hierarchical 




to minimize the discriminatory harassment and instead attribute any failures to 
themselves.87 
(b) Employer Grievance Procedures. If aggrieved employees decide to do 
something, a likely next step is to explore grievance procedures within the organization.  
This may mean complaining to their supervisor, another manager, or someone in the 
human resources department who has been informally or formally designated as the 
person who deals with these types of complaints.  These procedures range from 
something very informal, such as an impromptu discussion between the employee and the 
alleged harasser, to a company-designed alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program,88 
to a formal grievance procedure including legal representation or union involvement.  
Some employees conclude that these processes resolve their disputes to their satisfaction, 
while others do not consider these grievance procedures effective, fair or credible.  Some 
employees may not use any employer grievance procedure, either out of choice, because 
they are not aware of the procedures, or because the employer does not have a grievance 
procedure.89 
(c) Administrative Agency Procedures. If the dispute is not resolved within the 
company, the employee may consider pursuing litigation on the basis of Title VII or other 
statutes.90 Before a private lawsuit based on Title VII can be filed, however, the 
 
87 A study by Harvard psychologists, for instance, found that minority group members tend to minimize 
discrimination and attribute any failures to themselves.  Karen Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor, Why 
Minority Group Members Perceive or Do Not Perceive Discrimination That Confronts Them:  The Role of 
Self-esteem and Perceived Control, 72 (2) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373-89 (1997).  By 
attributing their failures to discrimination, minority group members can protect their self-esteem about their 
ability to perform.  By minimizing discrimination, however, they can protect their perception of the social 
system’s esteem and their perception of control.  These psychologists hypothesize that minority group 
members apparently prefer the psychological benefits of minimizing discrimination rather than the benefits 
derived from acknowledging discrimination. 
88 An increase in company ADR programs is prompted in part by a string of Supreme Court decisions 
legitimizing arbitration and other ADR processes for employment disputes, i.e., Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(2001).  See generally LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, ADR IN THE 
WORKPLACE 546-672 (2000).  Companies believe there are economic and strategic reasons for the 
increased use of internal ADR programs. 
 Some of these ADR programs are voluntary, but companies also are instituting mandatory 
programs in employment contracts or employment handbooks.  In other words, to the extent that racial 
harassment claims fall within the scope of a mandatory ADR program, employees may be barred from 
pursuing their claims in the courts.  While the courts may scrutinize the terms of these mandatory ADR 
agreements for unconscionability, lack of consideration, or other contractual inadequacies, e.g., Armendariz 
v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000); and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 
279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002)), the Supreme Court has unequivocally held in the Gilmer and Circuit City 
cases cited above that the agreements in general are enforceable. 
89 Employees and employers may recognize that grievance procedures are sometimes problematic.  See,
e.g., David Lewin & R.B. Peterson, Behavioral Outcomes of Grievance Activity, 38 INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 554-76 (1999) (documenting negative outcomes for employees who use grievance procedures).  
At the same time, the existence of an employer’s grievance procedure and the employee’s failure to use it is 
relevant to the employer’s affirmative defense.  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808-09. 
90 See infra discussion accompanying notes 97-109. 
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employee must first go through administrative procedures administered by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).91 This includes strict time limits under 
which the individual must file charges with the EEOC.92 This charge triggers a number 
of EEOC procedures, including notice to the employer, an investigation of the facts, and 
efforts to settle the charge.93 
If the EEOC believes that harassment has occurred, it attempts conciliation with 
the employer to remedy the harassment.  If conciliation is unsuccessful, the EEOC can 
either bring suit in federal court94 or close the case, after which the employee can file a 
lawsuit on her or his own behalf within a specified time period.95 If the EEOC is satisfied 
that there has not been racial harassment, it may dismiss the charge at any point in the 
administrative process.  The employee can then file a lawsuit.96 If the case has been 
successfully conciliated, mediated, or settled, neither the EEOC nor the employee can go 
to court unless the agreement between the parties is not honored. 
 
2.  Litigation Process
After these administrative procedures, many employees do not proceed further, 
even if the dispute has not been resolved.  They may have exhausted their financial or 
emotional resources, reassessed their legal claim and determined it is not sufficiently 
viable, or simply wanted to move on to other priorities in their lives.  Some, however, do 
move ahead with private litigation. 
 
91 Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992).  This allows the EEOC to investigate 
the claim and provides the employer notice of the complaint and the opportunity to settle the dispute 
through conference, conciliation, or persuasion.  Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions 
and Answers, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.htm. See generally EEOC Compl. Man. 
(CCH); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6 to 1601.29 Subpart B—Procedures for the Prevention of Unlawful 
Employment Practices. 
92 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13. 
93 As an alternative to a lengthy investigation process, the parties may be selected for the EEOC’s 
expanding mediation program.  EEOC mediation is voluntary and confidential.  If the mediation is not 
successful, the dispute returns to the EEOC process.  For the EEOC website describing the mediation 
program, see http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/. See also E. Patrick McDermott, An Evaluation of the EEOC 
Mediation Program, available at http://eeoc.gov/mediate/report/chapter2/html.
94 Only a small percentage of employment discrimination lawsuits are brought by the EEOC on behalf of 
the employee.  In the 87 EEOC cases that went to trial over five years, the EEOC had a success rate of 
about 60%, comparing favorably with 27% success rate for private attorneys found in an analysis of the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’ data cited by the EEOC.  Of 15 cases at the appellate level, there 
was a success rate of 80%, compared to private attorneys’ success rate of 16%.  Internal Review Reflects 
High Success Level of EEOC Attorneys:  Recent Filings on Upswing, BNA 9-19-02 HRR at 906, available 
at http://www.eeoc.gov. 
95 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28.  In addition, the charging party can also request a notice of “right to sue” from the 
EEOC 180 days after the charge was first filed, and then bring suit within 90 days after receiving this 
notice.  Id. 




(a) Statutory Bases for Racial Harassment Claim. The most apparent federal 
cause-of-action for racial harassment in the workplace is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
or 1964.  As earlier discussed, the Supreme Court had delineated the broad parameters of 
Title VII liability for sexual harassment hostile environment, which have also been 
applied to the racial harassment context.97 
In addition to Title VII, prospective plaintiffs can also consider two post Civil 
War statutes, Sections 1981 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as federal causes 
of action for racial harassment.98 Section 1981 provides that all persons in the United 
States “shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”99 The Civil Rights Act of 
1991 amends Section 1981 to expressly cover not only the making and enforcing of the 
employment contract but also the “enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and 
conditions of the contractual relationship.”100 Although Section 1981 applies to settings 
other than employment, approximately 77% of all Section 1981 claims involve 
employment claims.101 Given its post Civil War context, it was designed to address anti-
 
97 Theoretically, there are two varieties of racial harassment prohibited by Title VII:  quid pro quo 
harassment and hostile environment harassment.  29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1.  Quid pro quo harassment 
requires that plaintiffs show “tangible job benefits [such as job promotions, raises, favorable reviews, or 
continued employment] are conditioned on an employee’s submission to conduct of a [racial] nature and 
that adverse job consequences result from the employee’s refusal to submit to the conduct.”  Hicks v. Gates 
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987).  Thus, if a supervisor communicates directly or 
indirectly to an employee “If you don’t let me ridicule you with racial epithets and stereotypes, you won’t 
get that promotion,” this would appear to constitute the kind of improper racial bargaining described above.  
However, there were no cases in the study where plaintiffs brought a claim of quid pro quo racial 
harassment.  Plaintiffs and their lawyers have apparently bought into the assumption that a claim of quid 
pro quo racial harassment is not possible, even though it would appear that such a claim is conceptually and 
realistically plausible. 
98 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII and Section 1981.  P.L. 
102-166 (Nov. 21, 1991) 105 Stat. 1071.  The 1991 Act was enacted, at least in part, in response to case 
law that many legislators felt inappropriately eroded plaintiffs’ rights.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a.  See Timothy D. 
Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:  What Does It Mean and What Is Its Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. 
REV. 304 (1992); and Jennifer Miyoko Follette, Complete Justice:  Upholding the Principles of Title VII 
Through Appropriate Treatment of After-Acquired Evidence, 68 WASH. L. REV. 651, 653 (1993).  Among 
other things, it allows plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages and provides for jury trials 
where compensatory or punitive damages are sought under Title VII; expands coverage of Section 1981 to 
racial discrimination in all forms in the employment relationship, including racial harassment (overturning 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)); and encourages the use of alternative dispute 
resolution processes for resolving civil rights disputes. 
99 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).  See General Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 102 S. Ct. 
3141, 3150, 73 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1982) (recounting history of these statutes). 
100 105 Stat. 1071, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).  While the statute was once interpreted in a more limited fashion, it 
now clearly applies to the private sector and to the employment relationship. 105 Stat. 1071, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981(b). 
101 Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 601 
(1988). 
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Black discrimination.  Like Title VII, however, it applies to all forms of racial 
discrimination including discrimination against Whites.102 
While both Title VII and Section 1981 address workplace racial discrimination 
including racial harassment and have essentially the same elements,103 they are 
distinguishable in a number of ways.  As the Supreme Court notes, “the remedies 
available under Title VII and under Section 1981, although related, and although directed 
to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent.”104 For instance, in 
contrast to Title VII, Section 1981 protection is not limited to employees of an employer 
having fifteen or more employees,105 and it appears not to apply to federal government 
employers in certain circumstances.106 In addition, there are procedural differences:  
Section 1981 does not have its own built-in statute of limitations, so plaintiffs presumably 
use the most analogous limitations period provided for under state laws107 (which likely 
is longer than the statute of limitations for Title VII claims).  Furthermore, it does not 
require an exhaustion of administrative remedies.  Unlike Section 1981, Title VII has a 
cap on damages and is directed only against employers, not individuals.  Jury trials are 
available for both Title VII (after the Civil Right Act of 1991) and Section 1981 claims. 
 
Section 1983108 provides a legal and equitable cause of action for individuals who 
have been denied a constitutional or federal statutory right by a state or local government 
official, such as the right to equal protection.  It does not provide its own substantive 
rights.  Section 1983 provides for an action for injunctive relief and damages against 
public officials sued in their personal capacity, subject to broad immunities and certain 
caveats.109 
(b) Legal Proceedings in Racial Harassment Cases. In theory, employees may 
have their cases heard on the merits before a jury or the bench.110 As substantiated by 
this study, very few disputes actually reach this point in the litigation process.111 More 
 
102 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, Transp. Co., 
427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
103 Thomas v. St. Luke’s Health System, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1413 (N.D. Iowa 1994), aff’d, 61 F.3d 908; 
Blount v. Alabama Co-op Extension Service, 869 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Ala. 1994). 
104 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). 
105 Section 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
106 Section 717, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.  Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1989); 
Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976).  Also, while Section 1981 would clearly cover racial or ethnic 
harassment, it does not appear to cover harassment on the basis of national origin.  Saint Francis College v. 
Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613-614, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2028-2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1987). 
107 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). 
108 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
109 Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
110 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c). 
111 See infra discussion accompanying notes 156-58.  See also Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary 




commonly, the employers as the defendants initiate a pre-trial proceeding such as a 
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment in the federal district court.  As 
further described below, these proceedings become the district court judge’s substantive 
analyses of the merits of the plaintiff’s case.  As such, these pre-trial proceedings often 
effectively dispose of the case, thus pre-empting the theoretically possible jury or bench 
trial on the merits.  While appealing the district courts’ holding on the pre-trial motions is 
possible, very few cases actually move to the appellate level.112 
A motion for summary judgment tests whether on the evidence before the court, a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor.113 “The purpose of 
summary judgment is to isolate, and then terminate, claims and defenses that are factually 
unsupported.”114 By granting the defendant’s summary motion, the court is agreeing that 
the plaintiff has failed to make an adequate showing on an essential element of her or his 
case on which she or he has the burden of proof.115 If granted, it will result in a 
“judgment” in the defendant’s favor (thus allowing the plaintiff to appeal).  By denying 
the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the court finds that a “reasonable jury could 
return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.”116 If there remains a genuine issue of 
material fact to be decided by the jury or other fact-finder, the court must deny summary 
judgment.117 Denial of the defendant’s motion constitutes a favorable outcome for the 
plaintiff in the sense that it allows the plaintiff to continue the litigation if the plaintiff 
chooses.  It is also likely to make the defendant more receptive to settlement negotiations. 
 
In a motion to dismiss, the district judge examines the allegations contained in the 
pleadings to determine whether the allegations of law and fact, even if true, are legally 
sufficient.118 (In contrast, in a motion for summary judgment, the district judge consults 
not only the pleadings, but also evidence such as affidavits, depositions, interrogatory 
answers, or admissions to determine whether any factual dispute exists between the 
parties.119) Under this motion, a claim may be dismissed either if it asserts a legal theory 
that is not cognizable as a matter of law or if it fails to allege sufficient facts to support a 
 
112 See also JUDITH RESNIK, PROCESSES OF THE LAW: UNDERSTANDING COURTS AND THEIR 
ALTERNATIVES 9-21 (2004). 
113 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN, & JOHN B. CORR, A STUDENT’S
GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 691-701 (2001 4th ed.) [hereinafter BAICKER-MCKEE 
ET AL.]. 
114 BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 113, at 691; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 327 
(1986). 
115 BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 113, at 692. 
116 Id. at 692-93. 
117 Id. at 691-92; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986). 
118 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); 12(c); BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 113, at 259-67.  12(b)(6).  Id. at 
259.  Motions on other defenses, such as lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person, were rare 
in this study. 
119 BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 113, at 689. 
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cognizable legal claim.120 The court presumes that all well-pleaded allegations are true, 
resolves all doubts and inferences in the pleader’s favor, and views the pleading in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party.121 There is a strong presumption against 
dismissal of the claim.  Dismissal is granted only “if it appears beyond doubt that the 
pleader can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the pleader to 
relief.”122 
Part II:  Characteristics of Racial Harassment Cases 
 
Part II paints a picture of racial harassment cases through an empirical description 
of the parties, the employment setting, the nature of the alleged harassment, and the 
litigation process.  It begins with a profile of the plaintiff employees and the individual 
and company defendants.  Part III then considers the effect of these characteristics on the 
outcome of racial harassment cases. 
 
A.  The Parties and Setting
1.  Plaintiffs’ Profile
In order to learn more about the individuals who bring racial harassment claims, 
this study gathers various information on the plaintiffs:  their gender, race, ethnicity, and 
a description of their employment.  The percentages given throughout Part II are based on 
the total number of cases in which the particular information is available.  For some 
variables, the information is not available in all 260 cases.  The actual number of cases 
(“N”) represented by the percentage is given in the accompanying Tables so that the 
reader can consider the sample size for that variable. 123 
(a) Gender and Race. As shown in Table 1, the plaintiffs in racial harassment 
cases are more likely to be men (58.5%) than women (41.5%).124 This gender 
distribution approximates the percentages of men and women in the general labor 
force.125 
120 Id. at 260. 
121 Id. at 260. 
122 Id. at 260-62. 
123 The plaintiffs’ gender is identifiable in all 260 cases.  Thus, in Table 1, women are plaintiffs in 108 
cases, which constitute 41.5% of all the cases in which the gender of the plaintiff is available.  The 
plaintiffs’ race or ethnicity, however, is indicated in only 234 cases.  Thus, in Table 1, African Americans 
are plaintiffs in 191 cases, which constitute 81.6% of these 234 cases. 
124 In coding gender, the study uses the gender designation indicated in the judicial opinion, although the 
coauthors recognize that the objective determination of “gender” and “sex” is contestable. 
125 The gender and racial percentages for both the general population and the general labor force are 
calculated on the basis of the latest available census data.  U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002:  THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK, at 16 (Table 14), 368 
(Table 562) (122nd ed. 2002) [hereinafter Census Bureau].  The percentages for the general population and 
the labor force are fairly comparable.  (E.g., African Americans constitute 11.90% of the labor force and 




Table 1.  Plaintiffs’ Gender and Race
As % of All 
Cases (N) 






































The ethnic and racial diversity126 of plaintiffs is notable in various ways and 
offers more of a contrast with racial demographics in general.  Minority plaintiffs 
constitute approximately 90% of all plaintiffs.  While African Americans are by far the 
most frequent racial group at 81.6% of all plaintiffs, the percentage of White American 
plaintiffs is larger than that of either Hispanic or Asian American plaintiffs.  Native 
Americans are virtually invisible as a plaintiff group with only one case. 
Moreover, the racial distribution of plaintiffs in these cases varies in distinctive 
ways from the racial distribution in the general labor force.  As shown in Figure 2 and 
Table 1, the comparison of Blacks and Whites is most dramatic.  African Americans 
 
general population.)  Given the work context of racial harassment cases, however, we opt to use the labor 
force percentages for comparisons.  The percentage for Hispanic Americans is based on a calculation in 
which Hispanics are deducted from each racial group and their participation in the labor force is taken into 
account.  For a detailed description of these calculations, contact the authors. 
126 In coding race or ethnicity, the study uses the racial or ethnic category indicated in the judicial opinion, 
although the authors recognize that the objective determination of “race” and “ethnicity” is contestable.  
There also are three additional cases where the plaintiff is identified as “not white.” 
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constitute approximately 12% of the labor force, yet constitute over 80% of plaintiffs in 
racial harassment cases.  In contrast, while Whites constitute approximately 70% of the 
labor force, they are plaintiffs in less than 9% of racial harassment cases.  Asian 
Americans are plaintiffs at only a slightly higher percentage than their percentage in the 
general population; Hispanics and Native Americans are notably under-represented in the 
plaintiff class relative to their representation in the labor force. 
 
We can further study this data by looking at the intersection of gender and race, 
although we should keep in mind that the number of individuals in the resulting groups is 
sometimes small.  As shown in Table 2, minority men are more likely than minority 
women to bring these cases.  Among African Americans and Asian Americans, 
approximately 60% of each plaintiff group is male.  All the Hispanic plaintiffs are men.  
In contrast, the percentages are reversed among White Americans, with women more 
likely to be plaintiffs than men. 
 
Table 2.  Intersection of Plaintiffs’ Race and Gender
Gender as % of 
Each Plaintiff Group 
in Cases 














































When we compare these groups’ representation in the study to their representation 
in the labor force, some interesting patterns emerge.  African American and Asian 
American women are under-represented as plaintiffs (varying from about 11-13% less 
than their percentage in the labor force), while Hispanic women are drastically under-
represented (in fact, not represented at all).  Thus, it appears that minority women are less 
likely than their male counterparts to bring racial harassment cases.  In contrast, White 
women are over-represented (about 15% more than their percentage in the labor force), 
suggesting that they are more likely to bring racial harassment cases than White men. 
 
(b) Employment Profile. While a common perception may be that harassment 




occupations.127 As displayed in Table 3, while approximately 80% of the plaintiffs are in 
the service and support occupational category, almost 20% are in the management and 
professional occupational category. 128 Management occupations include financial 
analysts and managers, hotel managers, accountants and auditors, information systems 
managers, and a range of other management roles.  Plaintiffs in professional occupations 
include lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers, counselors, social workers, educators, 
psychologists, scientists, and economists. 
 
Table 3.  Plaintiffs’ Occupations
As % of Cases  (N) 
 Management and Professional: 19.3% (45) 
 Management      10.7  (25) 
 Professional Occupations     8.6  (20) 
 
Service and Support: 80.7 (188) 
 (Select Categories) 
 Office and Administrative Supervision   21.5  (50) 
 Production      10.7  (25) 
 Protective Services     8.2  (19) 
 Sales       7.3  (17) 
 Installation and Repair     5.2  (12) 
 Transportation      4.7  (11) 
 Healthcare Support     4.3  (10) 
 Service and support occupations are varied, including the examples in Table 3.129 
The occupation with the most plaintiffs in any category is office and administrative 
supervision positions (with over 20% of all plaintiffs), which include secretaries, office 
assistants, computer operators, drafters, and phone operators.  Following in size among 
service and support occupations are plaintiffs in production, which includes assemblers, 
fabricators, machinists, welders, food processing, textile production, and woodworkers.  
The next largest group is protective services occupations, which include police, 
firefighters, security personnel, corrections officers, and park rangers—an irony given 
their occupational focus. 
 
127 The plaintiffs’ occupations are coded according to a categorization system provided by the U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, available 
at http://www.bls.gov/oco/home.htm. There are over 24 different occupational categories under the major 
headings of management and business and financial operations occupations, professional and related 
occupations, and service occupations.  In addition, the authors added seven categories which appear 
distinguishable from the 24 original categories.  (Complete details are on file with the authors.)  Job 
patterns for women and minorities in private industry for the year 2000, available at http://www.eeoc.gov.
128 These percentages are based on the 233 cases in which the plaintiffs’ occupation is indicated.  This 
study thus substantiates that discriminatory harassment allegedly occurs at all occupational levels, 
including among management and professionals.  See also Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to 
Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982). 
129 All other service and support occupations have nine or fewer cases. 
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Furthermore, while this is not always the case, many plaintiffs are long-time 
employees; their average tenure is 8.36 years.130 (This runs counter to the notions that 
increased contact and working with people of different races inevitably decreases racism 
and that people can only be uncivil to “strangers.”131)
2.  Defendants’ Profile
In addition to learning about the individuals who are the targets of harassment, we 
learned about the individuals and companies who are accused of misconduct.  Gathering 
this information helps us better understand who, where, and perhaps why harassment 
occurs.  This study considers the gender and race of the accused harassers; whether the 
alleged harassment is committed by a single individual or multiple individuals; whether 
the harassers are supervisors, co-workers or both; and the industry and employer settings 
in which they work. 
 
(a) Individual Harassers. The race and gender information of the alleged 
harassers reveals interesting patterns, as shown in Table 4.  For instance, men constitute 
two-thirds and women one-third of the alleged harassers. 132 About three-quarters of 
these individuals are White, although 20% are Black and a small percentage are Asian.133 
Table 4.  Alleged Harassers’ Gender and Race





























As compared to the general labor force, there are fewer women harassers and 
more men harassers than one might expect.  Interestingly, as shown in Figure 3 and Table 
4, there are more Black and Asian harassers than one might expect given their 
percentages in the workforce.  White harassers, on the other hand, approximate their 
percentage in the labor force, while Hispanics are not represented at all. 
 
130 This average is based on the 207 cases for which tenure is indicated. 
131 In some cases, the alleged harasser is a new boss or coworker. 
132 The gender of the accused harassers is indicated in 144 cases. 
133 The race of the alleged harasser is indicated in 85 cases. There are seven additional cases where the 
defendant is identified as a race other than the plaintiff’s race, but the opinion did not indicate the specific 




While the numbers are small, we can make some interesting observations when 
we consider the race and the gender of defendants simultaneously.  As indicated in Table 
5, it appears that both African American men and White men are more likely to be 
accused of racial harassment than are their female counterparts.134 White men constitute 
about two-thirds of White defendants; and Black men constitute 80% of Black 
defendants.  Furthermore, this over-representation of men among African American 
defendants is unexpected given that African American men are only 45% of all African 
Americans in the labor force. 
 
Table 5.  Intersection of Alleged Harassers’ Race and Gender
Gender as % of Each 
Defendant Group in 
Cases 

























While our image may be that harassment most typically occurs one-on-one with 
the harasser being the employee’s supervisor, that is not the complete picture.  As shown 
in Table 6, in about two-thirds of the cases, plaintiffs claim that more than one person 
harassed them.  The organizational status and the group composition of the harassers are 
also interesting.135 In almost half of the cases, the supervisor is the alleged harasser, but 
 
134 Among Asian American defendants, two are women and none are men.  In two cases, the defendants are 
identified as African American but their gender is not indicated.  Hence, there are fewer cases with African 
American harassers indicated in Table 5 than in Table 4. 
135 The organizational status and the composition of the group of alleged harassers is indicated in 222 cases. 
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co-workers are harassers as well (20.7%).  Perhaps most revealing is that in 31% of the 
cases, the accused harassers include both a supervisor and a co-worker. 
 
(b) Company Defendants. As shown in Table 6, in racial harassment cases the 
employing company is almost always a named defendant.136 Some plaintiffs also sue the 
specific individuals that they claim harassed them.  In 31.5% of the cases, both the 
company and the individual harasser(s) are named defendants. 
 
Table 6.  Alleged Harassers’ and Employers’ Defendant Profiles
As % of Cases (N) 
Number of Harassers:
Individual 
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Transportation 




Information and Communications 
Educational Services 























Since plaintiffs routinely name their employing company, we could identify the 
range of employment settings in which harassment allegedly occurs.  In addition to 
identifying the company’s industry, we determined that, while about 70% of the work 
settings in which harassment allegedly occurs are private businesses, public sector 
 
136 This is consistent with Title VII’s prohibition of the “employer” (rather than individual defendants) to 




settings are not immune with about 30% of the cases set there.137 (See Table 6.)  Among 
the public sector employers in the study who identify their government level, federal 
government employers are less likely than state or local employers to be alleged 
harassers. 
 
While the prior occupational information on plaintiffs in Table 3 tells us what 
kinds of jobs the plaintiffs have, the information on the industrial categories of the 
defendant companies tells us with what kinds of employers plaintiffs work.138 For 
instance, plaintiffs may work as lawyers or as secretaries (as previously discussed) in a 
range of industries such as health care, finance, or professional services.  Having both the 
plaintiff’s occupation and the companies’ industry gives us a more complete picture of 
the employment context in which harassment allegedly occurs.139 As with the data on 
private sector versus public sector, the data on industrial categories confirms that charges 
of racial harassment are not limited to isolated employment settings. 
 
As illustrated in Table 6, the study reveals that there are allegations of harassment 
across many industrial categories in both the private and public sectors.140 The largest 
number of cases occur in the manufacturing sector (17.8%).  This sector includes all 
kinds of manufacturing enterprises, including manufacturers of metal products, 
computers and electronic products, appliances, transportation equipment, furniture and 
related products, food, plastics, and textiles.  Ironically, given their purposes, two 
categories have notably high percentages of harassment claims:  health care and social 
services (including hospitals, nursing homes, and other allied health and social service 
facilities) (13.8%) and corrections and security (including law enforcement, prisons, fire 
departments and the military) (10.5%).  Professional services including law firms, 
accounting firms, architectural and engineering firms, computer services, and consulting 
services are not immune with 5.7% of the cases. 
 
137 There are six additional cases where the defendants are unions and utilities but it was unclear if they are 
in the private or public sectors. 
138 Defendant employers’ industries are indicated in 247 of the cases. 
139 There has been a range of research on racial discrimination, including racial harassment, in specific 
occupational areas.  See, e.g., Giselle Corbie-Smith, Erica Frank, Herbert W. Nickens & Lisa Elon, 
Prevalences and Correlates of Ethnic Harassment in the U.S. Women Physicians’ Health Study, 74(6) 
ACAD. MED. 695 (1999); ARAVINDA NADIMPALLI-REEVES, GENDER MATTERS, RACE MATTERS: A
QUALITTIVE ANALYSIS OF GENDER AND RACE DYNAMICS IN LAW FIRMS (2001) (dissertation noting racial 
and sexual harassment of African American female attorneys); and Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-
Clark, Identity and Racial Harassment, SSRN Paper ID IZA Discussion Paper No. 1149 (May 4, 2004), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=547582 (exploring racial harassment in the 
military). 
140 The defendant company’s industries are coded according to a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
system provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sicsearch.html, although the authors added some additional 
categories that seemed distinguishable from the original SIC categories.  (Complete details are on file with 
the authors.) 
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3.  Novel Fact Patterns
As one might predict, the most common fact pattern by far involves a White 
supervisor harassing a minority employee.  Novel fact patterns, however, are noteworthy.  
They prompt us to question our factual assumptions, perhaps suggesting unnoticed but 
revealing racial dynamics.  They also may be predictive of future patterns.  These more 
novel patterns collectively account for over 20% of all the cases in the study, as indicated 
in Table 7.  Hence, although they are not typical, they also are not rare.  We therefore 
thought it useful to identify and label novel fact patterns found in the cases. 
 
Table 7.  Novel Fact Patterns
As % of Cases  (N) 
 
Same-Race Harassment  3.1% (8) 
Minority-on-Minority Harassment  3.5 (9) 
Minority-on-White Harassment 3.8 (10) 
Third-party Harassment 1.2 (3) 
Contra-power Harassment 3.1 (8) 
Derivative Harassment 5.0 (13) 
Some cases are atypical because of the races of the parties.  For instance, in some 
cases both the harasser and victim are of the same race (“same-race harassment”).  In 
other cases, both the harasser and the victim are minority, but are of different races 
(“minority-on-minority harassment”).  Then there are cases with a minority harasser and 
a White victim which might be viewed as reverse harassment. 
 
Some cases are novel because of the status of the parties; they do not involve the 
typical pairing of a harassing supervisor and a plaintiff who is the targeted employee.  For 
example, in some cases, the harasser is not a supervisor or another coworker, but rather a 
third party such as a customer (“third-party harassment”).  In other cases, the power 
status of the parties of the parties is reversed.  Rather than a supervisor with ostensible 
organizational power, the harasser is an employee who harasses his or her supervisor 
(“contra-power harassment”).  Finally, in some cases, the plaintiff employee is not the 
target of harassment, but rather the target is some other person such as another employee, 
a customer, or a family member (“derivative harassment”).  In some of these derivative 
harassment cases, the plaintiff-employee may be harassed because of their association 





B.  Nature of the Harassment
1.  Types of Harassment
Consistent with social science research,141 plaintiffs’ complaints in this study 
indicate that perpetrators use strikingly varied ways to harass them.  Plaintiffs claim that 
some forms of harassment are patently obvious while others are much more subtle.  We 
identify over 50 discrete types of harassment.  These types of harassment are grouped in 
four major categories, similar to categories recognized in social science research:142 
Verbal Harassment, Physical Objects, Physical Conduct, and Work-related Decisions.  In 
many cases, plaintiffs claim they are harassed in more than one way.  In any one case, if 
there are multiple forms of harassment, each one is identified and coded.  Hence, a 
plaintiff’s claim of harassment might fall in one or all of the categories or in multiple 
ways within each category. 
 
Some cases report very detailed accounts of plaintiffs’ experiences while others 
offer more cursory descriptions.  Much of the information obtained in this study is 
objectively determinable, such as plaintiffs’ job positions or the procedural characteristics 
of the litigation process.  The information on the nature of the harassment, however, is 
filtered through the perception of the plaintiffs and then through the reporting discretion 
of the judges writing the opinions.143 Table 8 shows the major harassment categories and 
the percentage of cases in which this harassment was noted.144 The discussion below 
offers more detailed information. 
 
(a) Verbal Harassment. This category includes all forms of spoken 
communication and also offensive gestures.  In 81.2% of racial harassment cases, 
plaintiffs claim some form of it.  While this communication is sometimes part of a 
general conversation (31.5%), comments are more typically directed at the plaintiff 
(60.4%).  A range of content in verbal harassment also is identified.  Over 63% of the 
cases include some form of ostensibly race-linked verbal harassment.145 In about a third 
of the cases, “nigger” or comparable racial epithets are used.146 In about half of the 
cases, there is an offensive reference to a racial group but the “nigger” or comparable 
epithet is not used.  In 11.2% of the cases, harassment is in the form of racial jokes. 
 
141 See supra discussion accompanying notes 58-62. 
142 See supra note 6. 
143 See supra note 8. 
144 Unless otherwise indicated, the percentages indicated in this discussion of the nature of harassment and 
as highlighted in Table 8 are based on all 260 cases. 
145 A surprising amount of scholarship on verbal racial harassment exists.  See, e.g., Brian Mullen, 
Ethnophaulisms for Ethnic Immigrant Groups, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 457 (2001); Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, 
Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and Competent Heterosexual White Men:  The Sexual and Racial 
Morality Underlying Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195 (1995); Eugene Volokh, 
What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997); 
Randall L. Kennedy, “Nigger!” as a Problem in the Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 935 (2001). 
146 Examples of other racial slurs reported in the cases include “chinks,” “spics,” and “wetbacks.” 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
34 
 
In contrast, in 28.9% of the cases, plaintiffs claim that they are harassed by a 
range of comments that are not on their face race-linked, but which the plaintiffs perceive 
as racial harassment because of the context in which the comments occur.  These include 
intimidating, insulting, or demeaning remarks and other forms of “aversive” verbal 
racism.  Sex-related comments occur in 9.2% of the cases. 
 
Table 8.  Nature of Harassment




Race-Linked Verbal Harassment 
Physical Objects 




Job Development and Enhancement 
Denial of Benefits 





















(b) Physical Objects. This form of harassment which plaintiffs claimed in 22.7% 
of the cases, uses a tangible object or medium.  For example, pictures, decals, cards, 
photos, graffiti, or posters (including those with Swatiskas, confederate flags or monkeys) 
are used in 12.7% of all the cases and letters or emails are used in 5.4% of the cases.  
Actual physical objects, such as nooses or Klu Klux Klan-associated attire, are left for 
plaintiffs in their work space (and occasionally at the work site more generally) in 5.8% 
of the cases.147 
(c) Physical Conduct. This form of harassment which plaintiffs claimed in 15% 
of all the cases, includes the use of physical force, such as shoving, touching, or hitting of 
the plaintiff.  While it may include physical conduct of a sexual nature, more typically, 
the physical conduct is non-sexual (12.3%).  This category also includes damage to 
property. 
 
(d) Work-Related Decisions. Discrete types of employers’ work-related decisions 
are grouped together thematically.  For instance, complaints dealing with formal 
employer decisions (such as plaintiff’s promotion, suspension, demotion, or a denial of 
compensation) are found in 24.6% of the cases.  Complaints dealing with employer 
treatment affecting the employee’s job development and enhancement (such as less 
favorable assignments, demeaning work, isolation from meetings, denial of training, 
 
147 The use of these racially blatant and offensive objects is apparently on the increase.  EEOC 
Chairwoman Responds to Surge of Workplace Noose Incidents at NAACP Annual Convention, EEOC Press 
Release, July 13, 2000, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/7-13-00-b.html (noting increase in racial 




denial of essential resources for work performance, excessive monitoring, and excessive 
reprimands) are found in 58.1% of the cases.  (In fact, the most frequent claims within 
this sub-category are less favorable assignments (28.1%), and excessive reprimands 
(22.7%).)  Complaints about employer decisions resulting in a denial of plaintiff’s 
benefits, compensation, or privileges are found in 16.2% of the cases.  A cluster of 
complaints dealt with the employer or others questioning the employee’s skills, authority, 
integrity, or personal stability (12.7%).  In summary, the plaintiffs in 65.8% of the cases 
perceive that these work-related decisions constitute, or at least contribute, to racial 
harassment. 
 
2.  Frequency and Length of Harassment
Harassment more typically occurs over a length of time (an average of about two 
and a half years) and with multiple incidents.148 Unlike sexual harassment claims where 
harassment sometimes moves off the work site and into a more social context,149 
plaintiffs in racial harassment cases rarely claim that harassment occurs outside the work 
setting.150 
C.  Litigation Characteristics
1.  Forum
This study also analyzes a number of litigation characteristics:  forum, type of 
proceedings, plaintiffs’ claims, and legal issues.151 The forum of each case is studied in 
three ways:  the federal circuit in which the appellate court or the district court is located, 
the court level, and the state in which the district court sits.  (See Table 9.)  Six federal 
circuits were selected to represent areas from different parts of the country, including 
circuits from the northeast, southeast, south, west, and central parts of the United States.  
These circuits, the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and the Eleventh, also include 
most of the largest metropolitan areas in the country.152 We then did a random sampling 
of cases within each of these six circuits (without regard to whether the opinion was from 
 
148 Based on the information in the opinions, it is sometimes difficult to determine when a particular 
harassing incident begins and when it ends.  Therefore, we could not count the number of incidents, 
although we did note if the plaintiff alleged multiple incidents and if the harassment appeared “ongoing and 
continuous.” 
149 See Juliano & Scwab, supra note 8. 
150 Only six cases reported harassment outside the workplace. 
151 Given the key role that judges play in pre-trial and trial outcomes, increasing attention should be given 
to these decision-makers.  In a subsequent study by the authors, a detailed profile of judges and judicial 
reasoning in racial harassment cases will be considered.  In this current study, only one aspect of the 
judges’ profile, their gender, is considered.  The vast majority of racial harassment cases at the district court 
level are heard by male judges, with about 82.8% (N = 192) of the cases before male judges and 17.2% 
(N = 40) before female judges.  Some of the judges preside over more than one case. 
152 Seven of the top ten metropolitan areas in 2000 are located in these circuits.  Census Bureau, supra note 
125, at 32-34 (Table No. 30). 
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the district court or the appellate court).  About 80% of the resulting opinions were from 
the district courts with the remaining 20% from the appellate courts.153 
Table 9.  Forum
































































Large Diverse States 







*These states are also included in the study, but have five or fewer cases:  Arizona, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Washington, Wisconsin.  There are four other states (Alaska, Nevada, Vermont, and 
Mississippi) and Puerto Rico in the six federal circuits indicated in Table 9, but no cases from 
these states were randomly selected for analysis. 
The Seventh Circuit is the circuit with the highest number of reported cases 
(having approximately a third of all cases).  The circuit with the second highest 
percentage of cases is the Second Circuit, followed by the Eleventh, Fifth, and Ninth 
Circuits.  A significantly smaller number of cases in the study come from the First 
Circuit. 
 
The courts in this study sit in nineteen states.  The number of cases from some 
states was sometimes surprising.  Given their populations sizes, Massachusetts and 
 
153 Some of the judicial opinions randomly selected as a district court case in the study were also randomly 
selected as an appellate court case in the study.  Approximately 23 cases in the study are linked in this way.  




Washington have disproportionately fewer racial harassment cases but Alabama and 
Louisiana have disproportionately more cases than one would expect.154 Two states 
account for the lion’s share of litigation activity:  Illinois with 24% and New York with 
18% of all cases.  While Texas, California, and Indiana are the next most active states, 
they each represent less than 10% of all cases.  These states assure some geographic 
diversity in the study since they are located in different parts of the country.  In addition, 
we clustered the states into two groups:  states that have the largest and most ethnically 
diverse populations (including New York, Texas, Illinois, California, Florida, and 
Georgia),155 and states with smaller and less ethnically diverse populations (all other 
states).  Over 70% of the cases in the study are from the large diverse states. 
 
2.  Proceedings, Representation, and Citation
While prospective plaintiffs might initially assume that suing their employers will 
eventually culminate in a trial on the merits, the study suggests that this occurs 
infrequently.  Trials on the merits occur in less than 5% of the district court cases.156 
(See Table 10.)  This result would not surprise those with legal training, however, who 
realize that very few civil cases, including employment discrimination lawsuits, filed in 
federal court make it to trial.157 The most typical judicial opinion in a racial harassment 
case deals with the district court’s disposition of a defendant’s pre-trial motion.  (The 
defendants initiate proceedings at the district court level in 90% of the cases.)  Over 60% 
of all the cases and almost 80% of the district court cases deal with a motion for summary 
judgment at the district court level.  The second most likely proceeding in these cases is a 
motion to dismiss at the district court level.  Yet in comparison with the motion for 
summary judgment, these proceedings are much fewer.  They constitute 9.2% of all the 
cases and 11.7% of district court cases.  Both motions are intended to stall or end the 
litigation before the plaintiff’s claims are reviewed in a trial on the merits.  At the 
appellate court level, the most likely proceeding described in judicial opinions is a review 
of the district court’s ruling on the motion for summary judgment (73.6% of the time).158 
Given that plaintiffs may appeal the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion, it is 
also not surprising that the plaintiffs tend to be the moving party (about 80% of the time) 
at the appellate court level. 
 
154 Their population size is ranked as follows, with “1” designating the state with the largest population: 
Massachusetts (13), Washington (15), Louisiana (22), and Alabama (23).  Census Bureau, supra note 125, 
at 23 [Table 19]. 
155 The states in this group are among the top ten states with the largest populations.  In addition, 
approximately 15% or more of their population is African American, Hispanic, or both.  Census Bureau, 
supra note 125, at 23, 27-28. 
156 These cases are bench trials on the merit at the district court level.  At the appellate court level, 3.1% of 
the cases dealt with a review of a bench trial at the district court level. 
157 Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, but Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, 
at 1; Clermont & Schwab, supra note 9, at 11 (indicating rareness of trials in employment discrimination 
cases). 
158 In addition, there are two cases of other appellate proceedings other than those indicated in Table 7.  See 
also Clermont & Schwab, supra note 9, at 20-21 (noting that appeal rates in employment discrimination 
cases are higher than in other cases). 
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Given the complexity of the dispute resolution process, including the 
administrative maze that plaintiffs must follow, one would expect plaintiffs to have 
attorney representation to provide expert counsel.  Indeed, in only 20.4% of the cases is 
pro se representation indicated.159 
This study also identifies the citation for each judicial opinion.  It distinguishes 
between the following categories:160 
(i)  Federal Reporter cases.  These are cases with a citation 
designating them as a Federal Reporter case.  These cases are considered 
“published opinions,” which traditionally are cited as precedents in the 
federal courts. 
 
(ii)  On-line cases, excluding Federal Reporter cases.  These are 
cases that are available on-line but do not have a citation designating them 
as Federal Reporter cases.  These cases are sometimes called “unpublished 
opinions.” 
 
Strikingly, only 38.9% of the cases in this study are Federal Reporter cases (published 
opinions).  (See Table 10.)  To state it differently, over 60% of racial harassment cases 
are not available through the Federal Reporter system (unpublished opinions).  Given the 
large number of cases in unpublished opinions, lawyers and parties who rely only on 
published cases are ignoring a substantial amount of case law that may differ 
significantly from unpublished cases in their facts, reasoning, and outcomes.161 
The high percentage of unpublished cases in this study is consistent with the 
current trend among federal circuits.162 In 2001, for instance, 64.2% of the appellate 
court opinions in the D.C. Circuit were unpublished.  This percentage is low compared to 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, where approximately 90% and 80% of the appellate court 
opinions, respectively, were unpublished.163 In fact, data from the Administrative Office 
of the United States indicates that the percentage of judicial opinions that are unpublished 
 
159 This compares to pro se representation in all Title VII cases (18.9%), Section 1983 cases (20.8%), and 
Section 1981 cases (13.7%).  Clermont & Schwab, supra 9, at 5. 
160 About a third of the cases (32.7%) are also available on-line but with a citation (typically from a 
specialized publication source) other than a Federal Reporter case citation.  All the cases in the study are 
available on-line through LEXIS, WESTLAW or both electronic databases.  See supra note 10 (describing 
research methodology). 
161 See infra discussion accompanying note 209 (describing effect on outcomes). 
162 Jonathan Groner, Circuit’s New Citation Rule:  Few Takers, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at 1, 7 
[hereinafter Groner]; and Pether, supra note 76, at 1465 n.139. 




in the Federal Courts of Appeals has been increasing, reaching 80% in 2000.164 Similar 
patterns occur in the federal district courts.165 
Table 10.  Proceedings, Representation, and Citation
As % of Designated Cases 
 
(N) 
Proceedings (At District Court Level):
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Motion for Dismissal 
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Review ofC





























Furthermore, this trend has prompted, in part, other issues.166 For instance, to 
what extent should courts allow lawyers to cite unpublished opinions and how will judges 
treat the precedential value of those cases?  Circuit courts vary in how they are answering 
this question.167 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits allow citation of unpublished cases as full 
precedents.  The D.C., Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits permit citation only as 
persuasive authority, but not as precedents.  The First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits do not permit their citation; and the Third Circuit permits citation but does not 
specify its treatment of the unpublished cases.168 Penny Pether critiques this widespread 
practice of unpublished opinions as essentially institutionalizing “private judging” in 
 
164 Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Court of Appeals, 3 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 200 (2001); Pether, supra note 76, at 1465. 
165 K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?:  Precedent and the Role of Unpublished 
Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 400 (2001); Pether, supra note 76, at 1472. 
166 Christopher G. Wren & Jill Robinson Wren, Letting a Thousand Citation Systems Bloom, ABA LAW 
PRACTICE MANAGEMENT SECTION NEWSL., June 2002 (describing controversies over domination of West 
Publishing as official source of cases and proposals for universal citations). 
167 Groner, supra note 162.  The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States voted to recommend a proposal to bar federal courts of appeals from restricting lawyers’ right 
to cite unpublished opinions (Proposed Rule 32.1).  Judicial Conference Backs Proposal to Ease 
Restrictions on Citing Unpublished Opinions, U.S. LAW WEEK, Apr. 20, 2004, at 2626-28. 
168 Groner, supra note 162. 
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ways that have compromised principled decisionmaking and particularly disadvantaged 
certain classes of litigants.169 
3.  Plaintiffs’ Claims
In our search of cases, we identified those judicial opinions where plaintiffs bring 
racial harassment claims under the major federal laws for racial harassment in the 
workplace:  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or Sections 1981 and 1983 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Some plaintiffs base their lawsuits on more than one statutory 
basis.170 In particular, as indicated in Table 11, 88% of the cases include Title VII and 
37% include Section 1981 as a statutory basis for their racial harassment claim.  Less 
than 5% of the plaintiffs in this study base their claim on Section 1983.  Cases in the 
study with dates after 1991 are presumed to be covered by the 1991 Act.171 (Almost two-
thirds of the cases fit this description.) 
 
In addition to allegations of racial harassment, plaintiffs often allege other 
employer illegalities.  (See Table 11.)172 These concurrent claims reveal plaintiffs’ 
perceptions of other employer misconduct, including other forms of discriminatory 
behavior.  It also suggests how racial harassment and other improprieties may be 
intertwined. 
 
Some plaintiffs brought a separate race discrimination claim charging their 
employers with a particular intentional business decision, practice or conduct that 
discriminated against them on the basis of their race.173 These race discrimination claims 
occur in 74% of the cases examined here.  Hence, it appears that plaintiffs frequently 
believe that employers both create a hostile environment and make specific decisions or 
institute policies that are racially discriminatory. 
 
169 Consistent with Ninth Circuit Judge McKeown’s thesis, she argues that federal judges developed the 
practice, in part, as a reaction to their “anxiety about floods of civil rights and pro se prisoner 
postconviction appeals litigation in the 1960s.”  Pether, supra note 76, at 1445, 1442-1465. 
170 Therefore, as shown in Table 11, the percentages of cases indicated for all three statutory bases exceeds 
100%.  Ten percent of the cases also include a state statute as the basis for their racial harassment 
allegations.  See also supra discussion accompanying notes 97-109 (explaining statutory bases). 
171 Specifically the cases with dates after November 21, 1991 (the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991) are presumed to be covered by the 1991 Act.  Technically, the Act would be applicable only if the 
alleged harassment occurred on or after that date.  Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) and 
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994).  However, the facts in the judicial opinion did not 
always provide the dates on which harassment occurred. 
172 Sixty-five cases had concurrent claims other than those identified in Table 11. 
173 One marker of these cases is that they refer to the framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) 
providing for (1) the plaintiff having the burden of proving a prima facie case, (2) the defendant countering 
with an articulation of a legitimate reason for the employer action, and (3) the plaintiff proving the 
defendant’s reasons as pretexual.  In contrast, the racial harassment cases focus on whether the elements of 




Table 11.  Plaintiffs’ Claims
As % of All Cases 
 
(N) 
Legal Basis of Racial Harassment Claim:
Title VII 























































Although not as common as the race discrimination charge, some plaintiffs also 
believe that employers discriminate against them on the basis of sex, national origin, age, 
disability, or religion.174 In approximately 14% of the cases, for instance, plaintiffs claim 
both racial and sexual harassment.  This raises interesting questions about the relationship 
between the two types of harassment.175 
Other concurrent claims are not directly based on discrimination, although they 
may be derivative to the allegations of discrimination.  They also reveal something about 
how employees react to employers’ harassing behavior and how employers react to 
employees’ complaints about harassment.  In almost half of the racial harassment cases, 
for instance, plaintiffs claim that their employers illegally retaliated against them.  
Plaintiffs’ concurrent claims of emotional distress in 13.8% of the cases suggest that 
some plaintiffs believe their efforts to deal with racial harassment take a psychological 
toll.  Plaintiffs also included a constructive discharge claim 10.8% of the time. 
 
4.  Legal Issues
This section explores the key legal issues raised by the parties and addressed by 
the court, most typically as part of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  Recall 
 
174 The distinctions between discrimination based on national origin and on race are not always clear.  See,
e.g., St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (ruling that “Arab” is a race even though it 
also could be classified as a national origin). 
175 E.g., see supra note 73, and supra discussion accompanying note 72. 
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that key elements of the plaintiffs’ racial harassment cases are that (i) the harassment is 
“severe or pervasive” and (ii) that the harassment is “because of [the plaintiff’s] race.”176 
These are distinct elements.  Thus, there can be “severe or pervasive harassment,” but if 
the harassment is not attributable to the plaintiffs’ race, the claim of racial harassment 
fails.  Similarly, if the harassment is “because of race” but the harassment is not 
sufficiently “severe or pervasive,” the claim fails.177 Predictably, the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment often argues that one or both of these two elements are missing 
from the plaintiff’s claim.  As shown in Table 12, in over 60% of the cases, the courts 
address whether the harassment was sufficiently “severe or pervasive,” and in over a third 
of the cases, they address whether the harassment was “because of race” or instead 
attributable to some alternative reason.  This study thus affirms the primacy of these 
particular legal inquiries in racial harassment cases. 
 
The courts also look at procedural issues such as whether the plaintiff’s complaint 
is timely or whether the plaintiff properly exhausted the administrative processes and 
remedies. Thus, in some cases, the plaintiff’s noncompliance with procedural 
requirements is the basis on which racial harassment suits are terminated.  These 
procedural pitfalls highlight how important it is for plaintiffs, or more particularly for 
their lawyers, to understand the potentially perplexing administrative and judicial process 
for employment harassment claims. 
 
Table 12.  Legal Issues
Issue 
 
Issue Raised As 




Resolution of This Issue 




Is harassment “severe or 
pervasive”? 



















Is complaint timely? 


















Our study also considers how these specific legal issues are resolved.178 Given 
that many cases have multiple legal issues, the court in any particular case may resolve 
each issue differently.  (How a court resolves a discrete legal issue also is not 
 
176 See supra discussion accompanying notes 41-48. 
177 While this was not studied empirically, judges sometimes appeared to require that the “severe or 
pervasive” requirement was actually a “severe and pervasive” requirement.  Hence, in these cases, 
harassment had to be both severe and pervasive to sufficiently satisfy this element. 
178 In some cases, the court addresses an issue but does not resolve it.  Thus, the percentages shown in 
Table 12 are based on the number of cases in which the court both addresses and resolves the issue.  For 
example, the courts raised the severity issue in 159 cases, but raise and resolve the issue in only 155 cases.  




synonymous with how the court resolves the case as a whole.179) In only 22.6% of the 
cases in which the court addresses and resolves the question “Was the harassment severe 
or pervasive?,” did the court answer affirmatively.180 In response to the question “Was 
the harassment because of race?,” in only 17% of the cases did the courts answer 
affirmatively.  From the plaintiffs’ perspective, the courts’ resolution of procedural issues 
is similarly dismal.  They lose their argument of a timely complaint over two-thirds of the 
time and their argument of exhaustion of their administrative remedies three-quarters of 
the time. 
 
5.  Reasonableness Standard
Plaintiffs must show that their perceptions of and conclusions about harassment 
and hostility in the workplace are “reasonable.”181 In the context of racial harassment 
cases, this means that their arguments that the harassment was “severe or pervasive” and 
“because of race” are justified.  In determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, 
the judge must select a point of reference on which to evaluate the plaintiffs’ arguments.  
As many legal and social science researchers observe, this choice of perspective can be 
both complicated and relevant to the outcome.182 They point out that the courts may 
choose between the perspective of a hypothetically gender-neutral, race-neutral 
“reasonable person,” or, in the alternative, the perspective of a “reasonable person” with 
the plaintiff’s particular personal characteristics.  Thus, this alternative model would use 
“a reasonable woman” standard in a sexual harassment claim, or “a reasonable Hispanic 
American” standard in a racial harassment claim where the plaintiff is Hispanic 
American.  Even more particularly, the court could acknowledge both the gender and 
ethnicity of the plaintiff and utilize “a reasonable Hispanic woman” standard.183 
This choice of perspective has important practical significance because social 
science research indicates that the “reasonable person” who is white and the “reasonable 
 
179 See supra discussion accompanying notes 217-19 (indicating outcomes of cases as a whole). 
180 For instance, the court’s affirmative response on the issue of the severity of the harassment includes its 
finding that (1) there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the severity of the harassment to be 
decided by the jury or other fact-finder, or (2) the facts are undisputed and the plaintiff has offered enough 
evidence on the severity issue that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 
59; BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 112, at 691, 693. 
181 Although there is more discourse on the reasonableness standard in the context of sexual harassment 
cases, there also are articles that discuss the reasonableness standard when the plaintiff is an racial/ethnic 
minority.  See, e.g., Tam B. Tran, Title VII Hostile Work Environment:  A Different Perspective, 9 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357 (1998); and Melissa K. Hughes, Note, Through the Looking Glass:  Racial 
Jokes, Social Context, and the Reasonable Person in Hostile Work Environment Analysis, 1995, 7 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 195 (1995). 
182 See supra discussion accompanying notes 63-65, and note 181. 
183 This inquiry can take various forms, depending on the nature of the lawsuit.  For instance, in a sexual 
harassment lawsuit, the focus is how Hispanic women perceive sexual harassment (in comparison with any 
other group including African American women).  In a racial harassment lawsuit, the focus is how Hispanic 
women perceive racial harassment (in contrast to any other group including Hispanic men). 
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person of color” perceive racial prejudice in the workplace differently.184 Thus, each 
perspective might yield different conclusions about whether there is harassment, whether 
the harassment is severe or pervasive, or whether the harassment is because of the 
plaintiff’s race. 
 
This study indicates that as far as judges are concerned, the debate on the 
appropriate reasonableness standard is mostly academic.  While social scientists and legal 
scholars argue the nuances of the issue,185 courts do not even raise it.  Except for the 
Ninth Circuit, which has expressly adopted the “reasonable woman” standard,186 other 
courts cite the “reasonable person” standard187 or do not articulate a particular standard.  
Even the judges in the Ninth Circuit do not always expressly refer to the perspective of 
the plaintiff’s racial group.  In only ten cases (3.9%) in the study did the courts explicitly 
use a reasonableness standard based on the plaintiff’s race.  What is notable in the study, 
therefore, is the absence of the reasonableness standard as an issue in the case law. 
 
Part III:  Outcome of Racial Harassment Cases 
 
Part II informs us about plaintiffs and defendants in racial harassment cases, types 
of racial harassment, and the litigation process.  Part III focuses on the outcome of the 
cases and considers how particular characteristics of the parties, the nature of the 
harassment, and characteristics of the litigation process affect the outcome. 
 
We begin with the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ overall success rates.  When all 
the cases in the study are considered, plaintiffs are successful in 21.5% of the cases and 
defendants are successful in 81% of the cases.188 Thus, defendants are much more likely 
to “win” than plaintiffs; or stated differently, it is very difficult for employees to win 
racial harassment lawsuits.  This is a dismal finding for prospective plaintiffs and an 
encouraging one for prospective defendants.  Furthermore, this study indicates that 
plaintiffs fare worse in racial harassment cases than in sexual harassment cases.189 
184 See supra discussion accompanying notes 63-65. 
185 Juliano & Schwab, supra note 8, at 582, 584 (Table 6), 577 (also noting that more articles discuss the 
reasonableness standard than courts adopting the standard in their study of sexual harassment cases).  A 
research of social science literature by the authors, for instance, reveals literally dozens of studies on the 
reasonableness standard particularly in the sexual harassment context. 
186 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
187 Some courts refer to the “reasonable juror,” “victim,” “person in plaintiff’s position” (without further 
specificity), or “fact-finder.” 
188 Recall that the percentage of cases where plaintiffs win when combined with the percentage of cases 
where defendants win exceeds 100%.  This is because there are a small number of cases where both 
plaintiffs and defendants win some portion of the proceeding and hence are counted as a “win” for both 
parties.  See supra discussion accompanying note 17. 





In addition to looking at the parties’ success and failure rates in all racial 
harassment cases as a group, we can also study how the parties fare in cases with 
different attributes. 190 Thus, this study provides data to answer these kinds of questions:  
Does the plaintiff’s or defendant’s gender or race, for instance, make a difference in 
whether the plaintiff wins the case?  Does the kind of harassment weaken or strengthen 
the defendant’s likelihood of winning?  Which characteristics of the case (for example, 
the state, circuit, or the citation) correlate with defendants losing their motions for 
summary judgment? 
 
While we cannot substantiate a causal link between a case characteristic, the 
judges’ decisionmaking, and the case outcomes, we can look for reasonable inferences 
about what is occurring.  In the last part of this article, we explore these possible 
explanations.  Furthermore, we can statistically test how likely it is that the results are by 
chance or not.  If the outcome is statistically significant at the .05 level, for instance, it 
indicates that the relationship between that characteristic and the outcome of cases is 
expected to occur by chance in only 5 of 100 cases.  Similarly, if the relationship is 
statistically significant at the .01 level, it indicates that the relationship between that 
characteristic and the outcome of cases is expected to occur by chance in only 1 of 100 
cases.  Effects that are statistically significant at the .05 level or .01 level, therefore, are 
particularly noteworthy because they indicate that some phenomenon is occurring that is 
unlikely to be explained by chance and, consequently, is especially appropriate for further 
study. 
 
A.  Effect of Parties’ Profiles
The length of time that plaintiffs work with their employers also appears to affect 
outcome.  There is a significant positive correlation between the plaintiffs’ tenure and 
defendants’ winning.191 In contrast to what one might expect, the longer the employee 
has been employed, the more likely the defendant will win the case. 
 
We also considered how a range of other plaintiffs’ characteristics affected case 
outcomes, as shown in Table 13.  For instance, women plaintiffs have comparable 
success rates to men, with women employees winning in 19.4% of their cases compared 
to men winning in 21.7% of their cases.  (As with all the Tables in Part III, the number 
(“N”) of cases represented by these percentages is indicated.192) This occurs even though 
 
190 This study also took into account the gender of the judges in the district courts.  See note 151.  When the 
judge is a woman, it appears to improve the plaintiffs’ chances of winning slightly to 27.5%, while the 
plaintiffs’ success rate before a male judge is 21.3%.  At the appellate court level, where cases are typically 
heard by multiple judges on panels (and where we did not identify the gender of the judges), the plaintiffs’ 
success rate is 21.1%.  See also Vicki Sanders, Justice in America?, RADCLIFFE Q. (Winter 2004) 
(describing research that preliminarily finds that race and sex of appellate court judges affect their decisions 
in employment discrimination cases). 
191 These relationships are statistically significant at the .05 level. 
192 To illustrate, in cases in which the plaintiffs are women (the variable being studied), the plaintiffs won 
21 cases, which was 19.4% of the time.  In this same set of cases, the defendants won 88 cases, which was 
81.4% of the time.  For some variables, the combined percentages of the plaintiffs’ success rate and the 
defendants’ success rate may exceed 100% because there are some cases in which both the parties succeed, 
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men have brought more cases than women in recent years.193 The success rates of 
plaintiffs of different races and ethnicities, however, varies considerably.  Asian 
American and Black plaintiffs have the lowest percentage of wins, followed by a 
significant increase of wins by White plaintiffs.  Hispanic plaintiffs have a statistically 
significant and a dramatically higher win rate than any other ethnic group.  In the single 
case with a Native American plaintiff, the plaintiff loses. 
 











Women 20.8% (21) 81.4% (88) 
Men 22.8 (33) 82.2 (125) 
Plaintiffs’ Race or Ethnicity:
African American 19.3 (37) 83.0 (159) 
Asian American 18.1 (2) 81.8 (9) 
Hispanic American 54.5*** (6) 63.6 (7) 
White American 35.0 (7) 75.0 (15) 
Alleged Harassers’ Gender:
Women 18.7 (9) 87.5 (42) 
Men 20.8 (20) 83.3 (80) 
Alleged Harassers’ Race:
African American 17.6 (3) 94.1 (16) 
Asian American 20.0 (1) 80.0 (4) 
White American 26.9 (17) 76.1 (48) 
Number of Alleged Harassers:
Individual 13.5** (10) 90.5** (67) 
More than 1 person 26.2** (36) 78.1 (107) 
Status of Alleged Harassers:
Supervisor Only 17.0 (18) 87.7** (93) 
Co-Workers Only 17.4 (8) 84.8 (39) 
Both 32.9*** (23) 71.4*** (50) 
Defendant Companies:
Private Sector 18.8 (33) 83.5 (147) 
Public Sector 22.1 (17) 83.1 (64) 
Federal 20.0 (2) 80.0 (8) 
State 23.1 (6) 80.8 (21) 
Local 20.0 (6) 86.7 (26) 
Length of Employment As length of E P more likely to win 
 
*This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .10 level. 
**This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .05 level. 
***This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .01 level. 
see supra note 17, or they may be less than 100% because of rounding of percentages.  The combined 
number (N’s) of both plaintiffs and defendants approximates the total sample size for that variable. 




As shown in Table 13, we also considered which of the alleged harassers’ 
characteristics affect the outcomes.  Given the small difference in the plaintiffs’ success 
rates when the harassers are female (18.7%) or male (20.8%), it appears that the gender 
of the harasser does not affect the outcome of racial harassment cases.  Thus, it appears 
neither the gender of the plaintiff nor the gender of the harasser affects the results.  In 
contrast, the race of the harasser does appear to make a difference.  In comparison to the 
overall average plaintiffs’ win rate of 22%, plaintiffs (who are most likely to be Black)194 
are less likely to win if the harassers are Black (17.6%) or Asian (20.0%) and more likely 
to win if the harassers are White (26.9%). 
 
The composition of the harassers, in particular their number and organizational 
status, makes a difference as well.  Plaintiffs are about twice as likely to win when there 
is more than one harasser.  In those cases, they win 26.2% of the time, as compared to 
13.5% of the time in cases when there is a single harasser. It is also interesting to 
consider the organizational status of the harasser.  Plaintiffs’ success is comparable in 
cases in which only a supervisor is the harasser (17.0%) and in cases in which only a 
coworker is the harasser (17.4%).  Strikingly, however, the plaintiffs’ chances of winning 
go up markedly (32.9%) when both the supervisor and a co-worker are accused of 
harassing. 
 
As shown in Table 13, the win rate of public sector employees is only slightly 
higher (22%) than private sector employees (18.7%).  Within the public sector, the 
success rates of employees at the different level of governments are comparable, although 
state employees have a slightly higher percent of wins. 
 
Finally, who the plaintiff names as a defendant also appears to have some effect.  
In cases in which only the company is named as a defendant, plaintiffs win 21% of the 
time.  When both the individual and the company are named defendants, however, the 
plaintiffs’ success rate improves to 28%. 
 
B.  Effect of the Nature of Harassment
This discussion considers to what extent various characteristics of the alleged 
harassment affect the case outcome.  These observations are particularly relevant in racial 
harassment cases, given that the major legal inquiries of whether the harassment is 
“severe or pervasive” and whether the harassment is “because of race” would seem 
largely based on the nature of the harassment. 
 
The study indicates some interesting relationships between the duration and 
persistence of the harassment and the case outcomes.  For instance, the length of the total 
period of alleged harassment has a significant positive correlation with plaintiffs’ wins 
 
194 See supra Table 1 & Figure 2. 
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and negatively correlated with defendants’ wins.195 This means that the longer the 
harassment continues, the more likely the plaintiff will win and the defendant will lose.196 



































































Length of Harassment As length of H P more likely to win  
**This variable is significantly correlated with the success rate indicated at the .05 level. 
As suggested in Table 14, the results indicate that the nature of the harassment has 
some modest relationship to whether plaintiffs or defendants win the cases.197 For 
example, plaintiffs’ success rates are higher when they claim more physical harassment, 
either where the harasser uses physical objects (27.1% success rate) or where the harasser 
physically harasses the employee or the employee’s property (28.2%), than when 
plaintiffs claim either verbal harassment (22.8%) or work-related decisions harassment 
(21.6%).  Physical conduct of a sexual nature is particularly significant.198 
It also appears that when defendants’ harassment is blatantly racist, judges are a 
little more likely to believe plaintiffs’ claims.  For instance, when defendants use 
ostensibly race-linked physical objects (such as nooses or Klu Klux Klan-associated 
attire) (33.3% success rate) or race-obvious verbal harassment (such as the use of 
“nigger”) (25.9%), plaintiffs are more likely to win than the average.  The range of work-
related decisions harassment also are studied in more detail, to see if judges view 
different types of employer decisions differently.  The type of decision did not seem to 
make a great deal of difference, although when plaintiffs claim that their harassment is 
 
195 These relationships are statistically significant at the .05 level. 
196 While it was difficult (based on the description of the facts in the opinions) to determine when an 
incident began and when it ended, we did note whether there were “multiple” incidents of harassments.  
Moreover, the study indicated that plaintiffs’ wins were positively correlated with multiple incidents. 
197 See supra discussion accompanying notes 141-48 (explaining various types of harassment). 




evidenced by an employer’s formal decisions (such as denying plaintiff a promotion, 
demoting or suspending the plaintiff, or denying the plaintiff compensation), they have 
the lowest probability of winning (17.2%).  Plaintiffs’ success rate when claiming 
harassment through other types of employers’ work-related decisions varies between 
20.5% to 23.8%. 
 
C.  Effect of Characteristics of the Litigation Process
1.  Forum
We also consider the range of litigation characteristics and their relationship to the 
parties’ success and failure rates.  We study the forum of the cases in various ways: the 
court level, federal circuit, and state in which the case occurs.  (See Table 15.)  At the 
court level, the parties’ success rates in the district courts and the appellate courts are 
comparable.  Plaintiff employees are slightly more likely to triumph in the appellate court 
(24.5%) than in the district courts (20.8%), but not by a significant margin.  While 
plaintiffs at the appellate level follow the general trend of losing, one small subset of 
cases is the exception.  Plaintiffs have very good odds of winning when appellate judges 
review the district courts’ bench trial decisions.199 
The study includes cases from six representative federal circuits; and the 
outcomes of the cases varied by circuits.  Excluding for the moment the First Circuit, the 
range of plaintiffs’ success rate varies from 12.8% in the Fifth Circuit to 23.5% in the 
Second Circuit.  Thus, defendants generally had much higher success rates than plaintiffs, 
but the gap between the parties was more dramatic in some circuits than others.200 In the 
Fifth Circuit, defendants clearly appear to be favored, with defendants winning a 
remarkable 92.3% of the cases.  After the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit and the 
Eleventh Circuit have the next greatest defendants’ win rates, both with over 80%.  In 
contrast to the other circuits, the plaintiffs in the First Circuit had much more promising 
odds.  In fact, they had better than a fifty-fifty change of winning.  Keep in mind, 
however, that the First Circuit had very few cases (N=12) relative to the other circuits, so 
inferences should be made cautiously. 
 
We also analyze the relationship between states in which the cases occur and case 
outcomes.  The six federal circuits studied include nineteen states.  Of the states in which 
there are at least ten cases, the plaintiffs’ success rate varies between a low of 8.6% in 
 
199 As shown in Table 16, plaintiffs succeed 75% of the time. 
200 Some legal scholars focus on judicial decisionmaking in particular circuits.  See, e.g., Cheryl L. 
Anderson, Thinking Within the Box:  How Proof Models Are Use to Limit the Scope of Sexual Harassment 
Law, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 125, 126-27 (2001) (noting the Seventh Circuit’s rigidity in its 
treatment of Title VII, particularly sexual harassment claims, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove 
their case). 
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California followed closely by 9.1% in Louisiana, compared to a high of 29.4% in 
Alabama followed by 21.7% in New York, 21.4% in Florida, and 20.6% in Illinois. 201 

















































































































Larger Diverse States 


















*This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .10 level. 
**This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .05 level. 
We also cluster the nineteen states into larger and more ethnically diverse states 
or smaller less diverse states,202 to see if these groupings are meaningful.  The study 
indicates a dramatic difference between the outcomes in these clusters.  Contrary to what 
one might predict, plaintiffs have notably higher success rates in the smaller less diverse 
states (26.9%) than the larger diverse states (18.7%). 
 
201 In states with fewer than ten cases, it is difficult to draw inferences.  However, in New Hampshire and 
Wisconsin cases, there is a statistically significant positive correlation with plaintiff wins; and in Oregon 
and Hawaii, there is a significant negative correlation with defendant wins. 




2.  Proceedings, Representation, and Citation
The type of legal proceeding appears to make a dramatic difference.203 (See 
Table 16.)  At the district court level, plaintiffs are successful against defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment only 16.5% of the time.  As some civil procedure scholars 
predict,204 judges are less inclined to grant motions to dismiss.  In fact, plaintiffs are three 
times as likely to be successful against defendants’ motions to dismiss, with a 
comparatively whopping 50% win rate.  The few bench trials on the merits end with a 
20% plaintiffs’ success rate.  Because motions for summary judgments are the most 
common proceeding,205 the parties’ success rates there substantially influences the 
average parties’ success rates for all cases. 
 












Proceedings (Dist. Ct. Level):
Motion for Sum. Judg. 
Motion for Dismissal 





















Proceedings (App. Ct. Level):
Review Sum. Judg. 
Holding 
Review Bench Trial 













































*This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .10 level. 
**This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .05 level. 
***This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .01 level. 
203 Across all types of employment discrimination claims, plaintiffs fare better at trials than at pretrial 
adjudications and better before jury trials than judge trials.  Clermont & Schwab, supra note 9, at 17-18 
(Display 11). 
204 Beiner, supra note 111, at 73 (indicating that liberal notice pleading in combination with rules of 
amendment under the federal rules of civil procedure have made it difficult to obtain a dismissal on a 
discrimination claim based on the pleadings); Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment:  Taming the Beast of 
Burdens, 10 AM J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 469 & n.193 (1987) (concluding that few federal cases are disposed 
of based on Rule 12 motions). 
205 See supra Table 10. 
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At the appellate court level, most of the proceedings are a review of a district 
court’s holding on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  In these proceedings, 
plaintiffs fare very poorly, winning only 12.8% of the time.206 This suggests that 
plaintiffs would want to keep this dismal success rate in mind when they are assessing 
whether to appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment.  Plaintiffs do much 
better in other types of proceedings, ranging from a fifty-fifty chance of winning jury trial 
reviews to winning three quarters of the appellate courts’ reviews of the district court 
bench trials.  The number of cases in some of these proceedings is small, however, so it is 
difficult to draw strong inferences from this sample. 
 
We also consider whether the party who initiates the proceeding (the movant) 
makes a difference.207 Although plaintiffs are not the movants at the district court level 
very often, when they are movants, their success rate of 33.3% is notably higher than the 
average of 21.5%.  The situation reverses at the appellate court level.  When plaintiffs 
appeal the district court decision, their success rate is notably lower at 15.6%.  This 
finding is consistent with our observation above that plaintiffs have a particularly poor 
success rate at the appellate level.208 Interestingly, however, when the defendant appeals 
the lower court’s ruling, the plaintiff wins significantly at about 78% of the time. 
 
Regarding legal representation, one would predict that plaintiffs that represent 
themselves pro se harm their chances of winning in all kinds of lawsuits.  That would 
seem particularly likely in employment discrimination cases, such as racial harassment 
claims, where the litigation and administrative rules and process are both complex and 
evolving.209 The study results are consistent with this prediction.  There is a dramatic and 
statistically significant discrepancy between the outcomes of cases where plaintiffs 
represented themselves pro se and of cases where plaintiffs had legal representation:  
pro-se plaintiffs are much less likely to win (11.3%).  Even with attorney representation, 
however, plaintiffs win only 24.2% of the time. 
 
Another variable that correlated with outcome was whether the judicial opinion 
was published in the Federal Reporter or available only on-line (unpublished).  Notably, 
cases published in the Federal Reporter (“published opinions”) have a significantly 
higher percentage of plaintiff wins (30.7% success rate) than cases not in the Federal 
Reporter (“unpublished opinions”) (15.7%).210 
206 In other employment discrimination cases, defendants also have this advantage.  Clermont & Schwab, 
supra note 9, at 22, 24-27 (finding that appellate courts hearing employment discrimination cases are much 
less likely to reverse defendants’ wins in the district courts than to reverse plaintiffs’ wins); Ruth Colker, 
Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001) 
(substantiating a similar defendants’ advantage in ADA cases). 
207 In the four cases in which both the plaintiff and the defendant are movants, the plaintiffs are successful 
in three of the cases. 
208 On the other hand, when both the plaintiff and the defendant are movants, there is a positive correlation 
with plaintiffs’ wins and a negative correlation with defendants’ wins (both at the .01 level). 
209 See supra discussion accompanying notes 90-122. 




3.  Plaintiffs’ Claims
As shown in Table 17, the statutory basis of the plaintiff’s racial harassment claim 
can significantly affect whether the plaintiffs or the defendants win.211 Plaintiffs who 
include Title VII as a basis of their racial harassment complaint have the lowest win rate 
(21.9%).  Plaintiffs who include Section 1981 have a slightly higher but statistically 
significant improvement in their success rate (28.9%).  Although the number of plaintiffs 
who include Section 1983 as a basis of their claim is comparatively small, those that do 
have a much higher win rate than the other two groups, winning over 40% of their 
cases.212 












Basis of Racial Harassment Claim:
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 Post-Civil War Statutes 
 ' 1981 























 Sex-Based Claims 
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 Sexual Harassment 
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*This variable is significantly correlated with the success rate indicated at the .10 level. 
**This variable is significantly correlated with the success rate indicated at the .05 level. 
***This variable is significantly correlated with the success rate indicated at the .01 level. 
211 We did not study the different combinations of statutory claims nor of cases with only one statutory 
claim.  It might be, for instance, that cases that are based on Title VII only or on Title VII and Section 1981 
but not Section 1983, have higher (or lower) plaintiffs’ success rates than the groupings we did study. 
212 This is in contrast to a study of employment discrimination cases that are filed and terminated in the 
federal courts, where the win rates of the three types of statutory cases are similar, but showing that Title 
VII cases had the highest and Section 1981 cases had the lowest win rates.  Clermont & Schwab, supra 
note 9, at 18 (Display 11). 
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In addition to the racial harassment claim, plaintiffs may bring other concurrent 
claims.  Furthermore, the study considers how these concurrent claims affect the outcome 
in the racial harassment dispute.213 (See Table 17.)  Among the overall discrimination-
based concurrent claims, plaintiffs who bring a concurrent racial discrimination claim214 
have a significantly lower success rate in their racial harassment case (18.2%).  In 
contrast, adding a sex discrimination claim appears to improve plaintiffs’ success rate to 
about 30%, while a sexual harassment claim seems to have little effect.  The other 
concurrent discrimination-based claims have varied effects, but for many of these cases, 
the number is small so it is difficult to draw inferences. 
 
We consider further the gender of the plaintiffs who brought sex-based claims and 
whether their gender makes a difference on outcome.215 Not surprisingly, most of these 
plaintiffs are women (35 out of 43).  Interestingly, the women plaintiffs who also bring a 
sex-based claim help their racial harassment case slightly (winning 25.7%), but men 
plaintiffs hurt their racial harassment case (winning only 12.5%).  This gender difference 
is statistically significant.216 
Among the other concurrent claims, as indicated in Table 17, both constructive 
discharge and emotional distress claims appear to help plaintiffs’ chances of winning 
their racial harassment claims.  When these claims are included in the lawsuits, the 
plaintiffs’ chances of winning improve to over 30%.  Many cases include retaliation 
claims, but their inclusion appears to slightly depress plaintiffs’ position regarding their 
racial harassment argument. 
 
4.  Legal Issues
This study offers data on a number of legal issues.  As we discussed earlier (see 
Table 12), it indicates how the courts resolve specific issues.217 For instance, it shows 
that when the issue of whether or not the plaintiff’s alleged harassment is “severe or 
pervasive” is raised, the courts answer that particular issue negatively three-quarters of 
the time.  Table 18 indicates the plaintiffs’ success rate in the case as a whole when the 
“severe or pervasive” harassment is raised (and in which the parties may have raised 
other issues as well). 
 
213 Sixty-five (25%) of the racial harassment cases have concurrent claims other than those identified in 
Table 17.  If one were to study representative disability harassment or religious harassment cases, for 
example, the plaintiffs’ success rate would be distinct from the success rate in racial harassment cases with 
concurrent disability or religious harassment claims.  Thus, the outcomes in cases in this study are not 
predictive of the outcomes in those cases.  Interestingly, however, we will subsequently compare and 
discuss outcomes in racial harassment cases and outcomes in sexual harassment cases.  See infra discussion 
accompanying notes 241-56. 
214 See supra discussion accompanying note 173 (distinguishing between racial harassment and racial 
discrimination claims). 
215 These sex-based claims include sex discrimination and hostile environment but not quid pro quo 
harassment claims. 
216 At the .01 level of significance. 




Not unexpectedly, the particular issues before the court can make a statistically 
significant difference in the outcome of the case as a whole.  When the defendants raise 
the core issues of the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment or of racial attribution 
(“because of race”), the plaintiffs’ prospects of winning the case as a whole are 
particularly dismal.  Plaintiffs lose their cases 82.4% of the time when the courts are 
asked to consider whether the harassment is severe or pervasive enough and an 
astounding 87.8% of the time when the courts are asked to consider whether the 
employer’s conduct is racially motivated or attributable to some other basis. 
 
Table 18.  Effect of Legal Issues on Outcomes
Issue 
Plaintiffs’ 
Success Rates (N) 
Defendants’ 
Success Rates (N) 
Substantive Issues:
Is harassment “severe or 
 pervasive”? 

















Is complaint timely? 


















**This variable is significantly correlated with the success rate indicated at the .05 level. 
This data also substantiates that plaintiffs who succeed in regards to one issue do 
not necessarily succeed in regards to another issue or win the case as a whole.  For 
instance, the courts resolve the “because of race” issue in the plaintiffs’ favor 17% of the 
time (Table 12), but plaintiffs win these cases as a whole only 12.2% of the time (Table 
18).  Apparently in some cases where the plaintiffs succeed on the racial attribution issue, 
they are defeated on another critical issue.218 
As indicated in Table 18, when the defendants raise procedural issues, the 
plaintiffs’ chances of winning the case as a whole are about one in four.  This is 
comparable to the average plaintiffs’ win rate of 21.5% for all cases. 
 
As we have noted, courts tend not to discuss the appropriateness of one 
reasonableness standard over another.219 In the ten cases in which the courts did 
expressly cite their use of the reasonableness standard of the plaintiff’s race, however, the 
plaintiffs won three of those cases.  While this is still dismal plaintiffs’ odds, it is slightly 
better than the average plaintiffs’ success rate of 21.5%. 
 
218 In the relatively few cases in which the issue of individual harassment is before the court, the plaintiffs’ 
chances of winning their case are substantially improved (53.3% success rate).  This is true even though the 
courts tend not to resolve the particular issue of individual harassment in the plaintiffs’ favor (resolved in 
plaintiffs’ favor only 25% of the time). 
219 See supra discussion accompanying notes 181-87. 
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Part IV:  Analysis and Discussion 
 
The extensive empirical study described in this article provides rich data on racial 
harassment case law.  Prior to this study, employees, employers, judges, lawyers, and 
academics had to speculate about the factual backgrounds, the litigation processes, and 
the outcomes of these cases.  Based on a detailed analysis of a representative sample of 
federal district court and appellate court cases between 1976 and 2002, this study offers 
an overview of the history of racial harassment cases.  This article reveals who brings 
these cases, the kinds of harassment they claim, the critical issues the courts consider, and 
the most frequent forums, among other important topics.  These cases also are proxies for 
racial harassment in the workplace—suggesting for instance, who the perpetrators are and 
how they harass their targets. 
 
In this final part of the paper, we briefly summarize key findings of this study and 
offer plausible explanations of these results.  We shift, therefore, from a statistical 
description of the case characteristics (in Part II) and the case outcomes (in Part III), to an 
integrated analysis and discussion of these results. 
 
As we explore why some cases are brought and others are not, we acknowledge 
that myriad explanations are possible.  Some general explanations may explain a number 
of results.  For starters, legal standards can make a difference.  For instance, how courts 
interpret “severe and pervasive” and “because of race” can encourage or discourage 
disgruntled employees from moving ahead with litigation.  Likewise, the cultural 
backgrounds of employees, supervisors, and coworkers also may be relevant.  For 
instance, individuals of certain cultures may hesitate to be confrontational, and thus may 
be less likely to engage in an adversarial process such as litigation.  Given the large and 
representative sampling of cases, however, it is also likely that the cases simply mirror 
what is happening in the workplace.  For instance, individuals of a particular race may 
constitute a disproportionately high percentage of plaintiffs in racial harassment cases 
because they are particularly and disproportionately targeted. 
 
Why are the plaintiffs in cases with certain characteristics more likely to succeed 
and the plaintiffs in cases with other characteristics more likely to lose?  When 
considering possible explanations, the key point to keep in mind is that the actual data 
regarding outcomes does not change, even though attempts to explain the data might.  
Thus, any explanation is persuasive only if it is consistent with the data.  As we examine 
causal connections, we acknowledge various potential explanations for case outcomes.  A 
particular group of plaintiffs or defendants may simply have “stronger” cases or “weaker” 
cases, given the applicable legal principles.  Some plaintiffs and defendants may have 
“better” lawyers or “worse” lawyers, given their resources and coincidence.  However, 
given the high number of cases analyzed, these individual case attributes would be 
expected to balance out statistically. 
 
A more plausible explanation is that judges have a collective bias in favor or 




plaintiffs’ description and interpretation of the events and contrast it with defendants’ 
version of the story.  Judges then must apply the applicable legal principles to the facts as 
they understand them.  This interpretive and evaluative process of others’ narratives 
deliberately and necessarily occurs in racial harassment cases.  In the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, for instance, the judge must decide whether the plaintiff’s 
narrative adequately shows that she or he was “severely or pervasively” harassed 
“because of her race,” or in the alternative, whether the defendant’s narrative is more 
convincing. 
 
During this process, judges interpret and evaluate the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
stories from a frame of reference that they have acquired over time from their 
professional, educational, and social experiences and backgrounds.  This mental model 
provides a conceptual framework that helps them sort through the factual details and to 
decide what is relevant and in what ways they are relevant.  As products of their 
socialization, judges may be consciously and deliberately, or as likely, unconsciously and 
unintentionally biased. 
 
A.  Racial Harassment Cases Over Time
Even though the Rogers case marks the judicial birth of the harassment doctrine 
in 1971, plaintiffs were slow to utilize the theory.  As illustrated in Figure 4, there are 
comparatively few cases each year between 1981 and 1991, a spike in 1992, some 
activity between 1993 and 1996, and then a clear annual increase every year from 1997 
on.  A peak of 38 cases occurred in 2002.  Hence, the courts saw a distinct upswing in 
litigation activity in recent years.  In fact, about 87% of all cases occurred since 1991.  
The jurisprudence of racial harassment law, therefore, has essentially been developed 
within the last fifteen years.  (The growth in racial harassment cases generally reflects the 
same growth pattern of all employment discrimination cases.220) This has presented 
judges during this period with the opportunity to essentially shape the doctrine.  
Moreover, because racial harassment law has received less attention than sexual 
harassment law, judges have been able to craft the laws largely unmonitored by 
legislators, academics, and advocacy groups. 
 
What explains the ups and downs in the number of cases and in particular the 
surge of cases brought after 1997?  Legal developments and societal events during this 
time do not necessarily favor plaintiffs’ position.  They may have nonetheless heightened 
public awareness of harassment in the workplace, including racial harassment, and 
possible legal causes of action.  The Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas hearings in 1991 
and important Supreme Court cases occurring in 1994 and 1998 brought these issues to 
the fore.  (At the same time, documented evidence of the plaintiffs’ dismal prospects in 
these particular lawsuits was not available until this study.  Lawyers could only speculate 
 
220 Employment discrimination cases have become an increasingly larger percent of federal civil cases, 
constituting nearly 10% by 2000.  Clermont & Schwab, supra note 9, at 1, 29-30 (study on civil cases, 
including employment discrimination cases (Title VII, ADA, § 1983, ADEA, § 1981, and FMLA), that 
terminate in a federal district court or court of appeals).  While employment discrimination cases peaked in 
1998, however, racial harassment cases continued their upward trend. 
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on the general prospect of winning or losing and they may have overestimated the 
probability of success.)  It may also be that these events particularly motivated certain 
plaintiffs who believed legal and social developments were strategically advantageous for 
them.221 For instance, cases brought by African American plaintiffs show a greater 
increase than cases brought by other racial and ethnic groups (Figure 5).  Similarly,  
 
221 Major legal events in contemporary harassment jurisprudence include:  the Meritor case in 1986, the 
1991 Civil Rights Act, the Harris case in 1994, and the Oncale, Faragher, and Ellerth cases in 1998.  See 
supra discussion accompanying notes 42-49.  The impact of major legal events is difficult to ascertain.  
Among other issues, there is an undeterminable time lag between the legal events and their consequences.  
As we have noted, the time between the beginning of a plaintiff’s dispute resolution process (perhaps 
prompted in part by a particular legal event) and when a district court decides the defendant’s motion and 
reports it, may be years.  Nonetheless, we can at least observe to what extent these legal events appear to 
prompt or chill reported racial harassment litigation in the cases in general and in the different groupings of 
cases above. 
 Given Figure 4, the Meritor case in 1986 appears to have had minimal short-term effect, perhaps 
because the case was perceived as a sexual harassment case rather than one dealing more broadly with 
harassment in general.  The 1991 Act was much heralded as pro-plaintiff which may have spurred 
increased litigation in 1992.  While the Hill-Thomas hearings in 1991 are remembered mostly as focusing 
on sexual harassment issues, much of the conduct at issue had racial overtones as well.  There also was 
controversy over to what extent the Act would be retroactive, which may also have spurred some litigation 
activity.  The Harris case in 1994 marks the beginning of a small incremental increase in lawsuits.  The 
1998 cases, however, are part of the dramatic surge in cases that began in 1997.  While we can only 
speculate on their precise influence, these 1998 cases perhaps in conjunction with the cumulative impact of 




around the time of the Oncale and Faragher cases in 1998, cases brought by men and by 
African Americans surged more dramatically than cases brought by women or other 
racial and ethnic groups (Figures 5 and 7).  Perhaps racial harassment in the workplace 
simply increased, as suggested by EEOC statistics on employee complaints.  Finally, 
judges may have been particularly willing to hear, write, and release opinions on racial 
harassment.  Perhaps they were cognizant of an increasing number of charges and sensed 
an opportunity to influence evolving legal principles. 
 
While noting that the number of racial harassment cases has increased in the last 
decade and a half, keep in mind that these cases still represent only a very small percent 
of employee complaints of racial harassment.  Thus, many employee allegations of racial 
harassment are never considered by the judicial system.  Legal standards may be so 
daunting that some prospective plaintiffs, even those with very legitimate claims, decide 
that pursing a remedy through the judicial system is not worth the effort. 
 
Although the volume of cases increased over time, as shown graphically in Figure 
4, plaintiffs’ and defendants’ success rates in general did not change significantly over 
the entire 21 year time period.222 Plaintiffs historically have been much more likely to 
lose and defendants more likely to win. This pattern has continued in recent years.  On 
average, the plaintiffs’ probability of winning a case between 1981 and 1991 was about 
one in four (26.7%).  When cases increased in number between 1992 and 2002, the 
plaintiffs’ average success rate was 20.8%, even worse than in the prior eleven years.  
The legal standards have not changed effectively or at least not in ways that affect case 
outcomes, despite various Supreme Court clarifications and interpretations.  A partial 
explanation may also be that the perception of more protective harassment laws in 1986, 
1991, 1994, and 1998 prompted weaker fact patterns, thus counteracting the effect of 
more protective laws. 
 
B.  Plaintiffs and Defendants
This study substantiates that employees in diverse occupations, including doctors, 
lawyers, and executives of all kinds, complain about being racially harassed.  A higher 
percentage of plaintiffs, however, come from the more subordinate and lower-paying 
service and support occupations (such as secretaries, production line personnel, police 
officers, bus drivers, and health care technicians).  Therefore, it appears that no 
occupational groups are excluded from racial harassment, while those in more 
subordinate roles are particularly vulnerable to abuse. 
 
Plaintiffs are both men and women of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, 
although there are some notable distinctions among groups.  In particular, Blacks are 
disproportionately represented, given their percentage in the labor force.  Are Blacks the 
most likely plaintiffs because they are the most likely to be targeted; that is, the most 
discriminated against?  Or is part of the explanation that Blacks are the most conscious of 
 
222 There were only a few cases between 1976 and 1981, so that an analysis by year did not appear 
meaningful.  In 1984, there were no reported cases in our sample; and in some years there were cases but 
none of which the plaintiffs won. 
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racism and the most likely to complain about it?  We should also pay attention to groups 
that are not bringing as many lawsuits as we might expect and consider why they are not 
using the judicial system.  There is substantial evidence that Hispanics are targets of 
harassment in American society, including in the workplace.  Hispanic plaintiffs, 
however, are underrepresented relative to their percentage in the labor force.  Are 
Hispanics less likely to formally complain about workplace harassment because of 
cultural characteristics, lack of knowledge of legal resources and remedies given 
language or socioeconomic limitations, or other legal risks that might be implicated?  For 
instance, some Hispanics may opt to ignore racial harassment rather than bring attention 
to their immigration status.  Thus, before they bring a lawsuit, their work situation may 
need to be extremely intolerable and egregious.223 In addition, the Black-White binary 
paradigm of race may also be unduly shaping racial harassment laws.  Judges have in 
mind Black plaintiffs and White defendants, so that other types of workplace 
discrimination that Hispanics and Asians face—for example, based on accent, perceived 
foreignness, or immigration status—might easily not strike lawyers and judges as racial 
in nature.  For many, “race” means “Black” and Blacks do not tend to experience 
harassment on these grounds.  The law of racial remedies, including harassment law, 
might turn out to be available to Hispanics and Asians only to the extent they succeed in 
analogizing what happened to them to events that, if they happened to Blacks, would be 
actionable. 
 
When it comes to outcomes for particular racial or ethnic groups, the number of 
cases brought by Blacks surged beginning the mid- to and late-nineties.224 (See Figure 
5.)  The increase in all racial harassment cases in this time period, in fact, is largely 
attributable to these plaintiffs.  This increase in cases, however, does not appear to be 
fueled by Blacks’ prospects for success.  In fact, as depicted in Figure 6, as compared to 
the period of 1981-1991 when Black plaintiffs’ average success rate was 22.7%, the 
success rate was 19.3% between 1992-2002.225 More recently in 1999-2002, when the 
case number steadily increased, the success rate was 18.7%.  Judges appear to be 
increasingly critical of African American plaintiffs, perhaps as a way of coping with what 
they perceive as the excessive number of cases. 
 
223 Perhaps this explains in part the comparatively high 54.5% success rate of Hispanic plaintiffs. 
224 Hispanic American, Asian American, and White American plaintiff groups had modest increased 
litigation activity beginning in the mid 1990s.  Given this relatively brief litigation history, it is unclear if 
these early cases are representative of future cases to be brought by members of these racial groups.  It is 
possible, for instance, that given the novelty of their claim that these plaintiffs were more risk-taking.  It is 
also possible that plaintiffs and their counsel pursued litigation in these pioneering cases in part because 
they felt they had particularly strong cases. 
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In terms of gender, while women are slightly less likely than men to be plaintiffs 
in racial harassment cases over time, men are much more frequent plaintiffs in recent 
years.  (See Figure 7.)  Beginning around 1999, however, the number of male plaintiffs 
dramatically increased while the number of female plaintiffs stayed flat.  The general 
surge in racial harassment cases in the most recent years, therefore, is more attributable to 
cases brought by men than by women.  Men and women plaintiffs had very different 
success rates over time and more recently.  Although women did not bring many cases 
during 1981-1991, they had a comparatively high average 44.4% win rate.  This contrasts 
markedly with their average win rate of only 17.5% during 1992-2002.  The success rate 
for men who brought lawsuits improved over time.  Between 1981-1991, it was an 
average 15% (substantially lower than female plaintiffs during that period).  Between 
1992-2002, it averaged 22.1%.  Thus, the trend in recent years is that women bring fewer 
racial harassment cases and are more likely to lose their litigation than men.  It appears 
that, even without empirical evidence, women employees are getting the message that 





Considering the intersection of plaintiffs’ gender and race reveals interesting 
differences.  Minority men are more likely than minority women to be plaintiffs.226 What 
explains this gender disparity among minorities?  Are minority men more likely targets of 
racial harassment and more likely to complain about it?  Or is it that when minority 
women are harassed, they are less likely to perceive themselves as targets or to bring and 
maintain lawsuits?  The absence of Hispanic women plaintiffs, for instance, prompts us 
to ask why this group does not utilize the legal system to address racial harassment 
abuses in the work environments.  It may also be that minority women who experience 
both sexual and racial harassment do not pursue a racial harassment cause of action, 
choosing instead to incorporate racial harassment into their sexual harassment cause of 
action.  They may do this at the advice of their lawyers who are more familiar with and 
thus are drawn toward sexual harassment laws.  Their lawyers may further recognize 
strategic disadvantages of bringing both racial harassment and sexual harassment claims.  
For instance, lawyers may believe that judges will “count” a racially tainted sexual insult 
toward either a racial harassment claim or a sexual harassment claim but not toward both 
claims. 
 
In addition to studying plaintiff employees, we also analyzed the defendants.  This 
provides data to help us better understand who commits racial harassment and fuels our 
inquiries on why they might be motivated to do so.  A distinct profile of alleged harassers 
emerges from this study.  They include women, although two-thirds are men.  They 
include 20% Blacks, 6% Asians, although 74% are White.  Men and whites are more 
likely to hold supervisory or other dominate positions in organizations than women or 
minorities, and therefore they may believe they can use their positions of power to harass 
without reprisals.  It may also be that these groups are more inclined to harass because, 
for reasons that are unclear, they are more prejudiced toward minority employees and 
choose to manifest that prejudice by harassing them.  (Given minorities’ perception that 
the workplace is racist, it may also be that some minority employees are more likely to 
label the conduct of these groups as racial harassment, when in fact, the conduct may not 
be racially motivated.227)
The data also indicates another interesting phenomenon.  Given the percentages of 
these groups in the labor force, men are disproportionately represented as alleged 
harassers but so are Blacks and Asians.228 The study reveals that minority harassers 
target the full range of employees, including Whites, other minority groups, and members 
of their own race.  Minority harassers may “just be going along” with ridicule instigated 
 
226 In contrast, White women are more likely than White men to be plaintiffs. 
227 Some white employees, given societal or organizational pressure to be accommodating to diversity 
initiatives, may also be hesitant to label a minority supervisor or coworker’s conduct as racially motivated.  
However, since 26% of the defendants are minorities, this does not seem to be widely true. 
228 Men constitute only about half of the labor force.  Whites are 70% of the labor force, Blacks about 12%, 
and Asians about 4%.  So, while almost 3/4 of accused harassers are White, Blacks and Asians are 
defendants at a 50% or higher rate than you would expect given their representation in the labor force. 
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by their bosses and coworkers, or they may be manifesting their own within-group 
prejudices or animosity toward other racial groups.229 
We also studied how the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ profiles affect how the 
judicial proceedings are resolved.  The plaintiff’s race is clearly relevant to the outcome 
of cases.  In particular, Black and Asian plaintiffs lose more cases and Hispanic and 
White plaintiffs win more cases.  There are myriad alternative possible explanations for 
these differences.  It could be that Blacks bring a broader range of cases, some with 
weaker facts.  It could also be that the cases brought by Hispanic and White plaintiffs are 
particularly strong, relative to the cases brought by the other racial groups.  Once again, 
however, these differences are statistically unlikely for the White plaintiffs over such a 
large number of cases.  On the assumption that plaintiffs’ cases across racial groups have 
comparably egregious facts, the more likely explanation is that courts have different 
tolerance levels for what is permissible harassment.  For instance, courts appear to 
demand more extreme employer harassment before they conclude that Blacks and Asians 
have been “severely and pervasively” harassed.  Judges, who tend to be White, may also 
be more unconsciously empathic with White plaintiffs’ claims, thus finding their 
positions more persuasive. 
 
The race of the harasser also makes a difference.  Plaintiffs (who are most likely 
to be Black) win a slightly higher percentage of cases if the alleged harassers are White 
rather than Black.  In fact, in the nine cases in which both the plaintiffs and the harassers 
are minority (minority-on-minority harassment), the plaintiffs lost eight of the cases.  
Based on this small sub-sample, there is some indication that courts find minority-on-
minority harassment even less plausible than White-on-minority harassment.230 It could 
be that the mostly White judges are not familiar with intra-minority group “racial” 
tensions and harassment.  For instance, they may not be aware of African Americans’ 
harassing each other because of variations of skin color, Hispanics’ harassing each other 
because of differences in immigration status, or Asians’ harassing each other because of 
historical animosities based on countries of origin. 
 
In contrast to race, the plaintiffs’ gender does not seem to affect outcome when 
considering the entire time period (1976-2002).  Female plaintiffs are about as likely to 
win as male plaintiffs.  (As we noted earlier, however, gender does affect outcome within 
certain time periods.)  Nor, for instance, is there any evidence that judges are more 
sympathetic to the harassment of minority women than minority men.  Similarly, the 
defendants’ gender does not seem to affect outcome.  Plaintiffs who accuse women of 
harassing them are as likely to win or lose as plaintiffs who accuse men.  Thus, the study 
indicates that judges are comparably critical of women harassers and men harassers. 
 
229 However, only 3.5% of the cases are minority-on-minority harassment.  This might mean that minorities 
are disinclined to harass each other.  Or perhaps there are intra-group pressures to maintain a solidarity that 
discourage minority employees from accusing their minority supervisors and minority coworkers of 
misconduct. 
230 In all of these eight cases, the plaintiffs are Black; in five of the cases, there are multiple harassers of 
mixed racial backgrounds including Blacks.  In the ninth case (in which the plaintiff won in part and the 




This study also confirms that racial harassment is not limited to any particular 
industry or sector.  Moreover, it appears that cases from the private sector are not 
meaningfully distinguishable from the public sector, at least in ways that affect outcome.  
The percentage of public sector employees who won their cases was similar to private 
sector employees.  Interestingly, plaintiffs who name both their employer and the alleged 
harasser as defendants are slightly more likely to win than plaintiffs who only name the 
company.  Perhaps in these cases, plaintiffs better detail the person and circumstances 
under which harassment allegedly occurs, thus bolstering their cases.  Or possibly these 
cases prompt the judges to personalize the alleged harasser, thus making the harassment 
that much more plausible.  The judges may also be less comfortable with the employer’s 
vicarious liability than the harasser’s direct liability. 
 
C.  Nature of the Harassment
One of the most striking findings in the study is that racial harassment is often a 
group activity involving both supervisors and coworkers of the targeted employee.  In 
about two-thirds of the cases, plaintiffs claim that more than one person harassed them.  
The combination of supervisors and coworkers as alleged harassers occurs in almost one-
third of the cases.  This data suggests that racial harassment is a more socially accepted 
activity than we might have suspected and that it frequently involves multiple individuals 
at different organizational levels appearing to “gang-up” on the targeted individual. 
 
Furthermore, it appears that courts also notice and disapprove of this “ganging 
up.”  Plaintiffs are twice as likely to win when there are multiple harassers rather than an 
individual harasser and twice as likely to win when both the supervisor and coworkers are 
engaged in the harassment.  These circumstances apparently strengthen the plaintiffs’ 
burden of showing that the harassment was “pervasive or severe.” 
 
In addition, unlike sexual harassment claims that allege that harassment 
sometimes moves off the work site into a more social context, plaintiffs in racial 
harassment cases rarely claim that harassment occurs outside the work setting.  Perhaps 
this is because coworkers of different races tend not to socialize together outside of work.  
Plaintiffs’ charges also often describe harassment occurring over a length of time and 
with multiple incidents.  This may be because courts have indicated the difficulty of a 
single or isolated event meeting the legal standards for racial harassment.  Thus, plaintiffs 
who have been harassed on one occasion, even though the harassment may be very 
egregious, probably do not bring lawsuits. 
 
Plaintiffs allege that they are harassed in an array of ways: verbally, with physical 
objects, with physical conduct, or with work-related decisions.  The most common form 
is verbal harassment, with plaintiffs in over 80% of the cases citing it.  Many of the 
comments are blatantly racial, for instance the use of racial epithets or clear offensive 
references to racial groups.  Harassing involving physical objects, such as nooses or Klu 
Klux Klan attire, also are overtly racist.  Thus, in contrast to societal perceptions, blatant 
racist harassment apparently continues in the workplace.  Plaintiffs also claim more 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
66 
 
subtle and covert harassment that is not on its face race-linked, but which the plaintiffs 
perceive as racially motivated because of the context in which it occurs.  Finally, in 
almost two-thirds of the cases, plaintiffs claim they are harassed by their supervisors’ 
work-related decisions.  These involve denial of promotions, job development 
opportunities, benefits, and the plaintiffs’ authority. 
 
While the existence of both blatant racism and subtle racism have been 
recognized by social scientists, a number of legal scholars argue that the courts do not 
recognize more subtle discrimination.  To an extent, this study supports these scholars’ 
contention:  judges are slightly more likely to recognize blatant racial prejudice than 
more contextual or subtle racial prejudice.  In perusing the plaintiffs’ presentation of facts 
and particularly when evaluating whether the harassment is “because of race,” judges 
tend to deem relevant only those allegations of harassment that are overtly race-linked.  
Thus, judges make reference to racial epithets such as “nigger” and to “noose” incidents, 
but tend not to find relevant plaintiffs’ allegations of their exclusion from professional or 
work-related activities; social isolation; or hostile, rude, and demeaning comments that 
do not expressly include a racial epithet.  Most judges do not know, do not find 
applicable, or do not find persuasive the relevant social science research on subtle and 
contextual racial harassment. 
 
Hence, harassment that is blatantly racist is more likely to persuade the courts.  
Employees’ claims of more subtle or contextual racial harassment are less likely to be 
successful.  Plaintiffs’ citing of employers’ formal decisions as evidence of harassment 
even hurts their case.  Perhaps courts assume that those decisions are management’s 
prerogative and are evidence of a non-racial basis for what the plaintiff perceives as 
negative employer treatment. 
 
Plaintiffs, however, should not be overly confident about claims based on 
physical and blatantly racist harassment.  Recall that these success rates are relative.  
These plaintiffs are still likely to lose in two out of every three cases.  It is just that 
plaintiffs without these types of overtly egregious racial harassment claims are 
considerably worse off. 
 
D.  Litigation Characteristics
Almost 80% of the cases in this study are district court opinions, and a very high 
percentage of these cases (95%) are merit-based (pretrial motions for summary judgment 
or dismissals, or trials on the merits).  Given the nature of these proceedings, the district 
court judges’ holdings are likely dispositive of the cases.  Defendants are successful 85% 
of the time when they bring motions for summary judgment and 54% of the time when 
they bring motions for dismissal.  While plaintiffs can appeal the district courts’ ruling, 
most plaintiffs do not.  Only 20% of the cases in this study are appellate cases and 
plaintiffs’ likelihood of success is about the same at both the district court and appellate 
court levels.  This study, therefore, confirms that district court judges, particularly 




plaintiffs theoretically have the right to jury trials, district court judges impose a 
substantial barrier to the plaintiffs’ ongoing lawsuit by ruling in favor of the defendant.231 
This study also indicates that federal circuits vary in their volume of racial 
harassment cases.  Over half of the cases occurred in either the Seventh or the Second 
Circuits, indicating the influential roles these circuits play in shaping racial harassment 
jurisprudence.  Certain states are the most fertile ground for cases.  Over 60% of the cases 
come from just four states (Illinois, New York, Texas, and California).  It is not clear if 
these patterns are attributable to an increased occurrence of racial harassment in these 
forums, particularly active plaintiffs’ lawyering, judiciaries that are more receptive to 
hearing these and providing opinions on these cases, or a combination of these factors. 
 
We also considered the effect of court level and forum.  The parties’ success rates 
in the district courts and the appellate courts are fairly comparable, with plaintiffs 
winning 20.8% of the district court cases and 24.5% of the appellate court cases.  The 
parties’ success rates varied across federal circuits and states.  While the Second, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, for instance, had comparable outcomes, the plaintiffs in 
the Fifth Circuit had a notably lower success rate.  On the assumption that courts are 
confronted with comparable fact patterns, these variations suggest that legal standards are 
not uniform throughout the United States.  In other words, courts in one circuit may find 
a particular plaintiff’s claims of racial harassment persuasive while courts in another 
circuit may not.  Outcomes across states vary considerably, although stereotyping of 
states is not appropriate.  Given California’s image as a pro-employee and ethnically 
diverse state which uses the reasonableness perspective of the plaintiff, one would not 
have predicted that it would have the worst plaintiffs’ success rate.  Similarly, given the 
Southern states’ image as more pro-employer and less socially progressive, one would 
not have predicted than Alabama would have the best plaintiffs’ success rate.  On the 
other hand, other states in the Deep South such as Georgia and Louisiana, did have lower 
plaintiffs’ success rates.  Keep in mind again, that these comparisons are still relative.  
Even in Alabama, defendants win over 70% of the cases. 
 
We also found that plaintiffs have significantly higher success rates in smaller, 
less ethnically diverse states than in larger, more ethnically diverse states.  Perhaps racial 
harassment complaints (and other racial discrimination claims) have become more 
commonplace in the larger diverse states and judges there have become more cynical and 
skeptical of them.  At the same time, racial harassment complaints (and other racial 
discrimination claims) may be more novel and therefore noteworthy in the smaller less 
 
231 Theresa Beiner proposes that a confluence of circumstances have led to increasing judicial hostility 
toward harassment claims and judicial inclination to use (and misuse) summary judgments, often resulting 
in inappropriate and premature dismissal of cases.  Beiner, supra note 111, at 19-23, 97-118.  For instance, 
she cites legal developments relating to summary judgments that effectively make it easier to grant these 
motions.  Judges also appear skeptical of legal developments, such as the Harris case’s clarification of the 
plaintiffs’ proof of damages and Civil Rights Act of 1991’s confirmation of the availability of jury trials.  
See also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV.
555, 557 (2001) (also observing the “general consensus” that employment discrimination cases are too 
easily filed and too easily won, but countering that “this picture is grossly distorted . . . these suits are far 
too difficult, rather than easy, to win.”). 
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diverse states.  Given their novelty, judges there may be more attentive to and 
consequently more sympathetic toward the complainants.  Likewise, judges in smaller 
less diverse states may be more vigilant to protect the state’s image from being branded 
biased or racist.  An alternative explanation is that plaintiffs may simply bring stronger 
cases, believing that weaker fact patterns will not get a fair hearing in smaller less diverse 
states. 
 
As the premier federal statute for addressing racial discrimination in the 
workplace, it is not surprising that almost 90% of the plaintiffs utilize Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  It was striking, however, that over a third of the plaintiffs also 
base their claim on Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
must see attributes of Section 1981 as beneficial.  Some plaintiffs’ attraction to Sections 
1981 and 1983 proved to be statistically justified, when one considers the effect of the 
statutory claims on outcomes.  Plaintiffs who included these post Civil War causes of 
action had significantly better odds of winning.  While Title VII cases increased in 
number in recent years, the plaintiffs’ win rates’ became worse.232 Meanwhile, Section 
1981 and 1983 cases increased more modestly, but their plaintiffs’ win rates stayed 
steady.  Between 1992 and 2002, plaintiffs in Title VII cases won on average 20.8% of 
the time, in contrast to plaintiffs in Section 1981 and 1983 cases who won on average 
32.5% of the time. 
 
The concurrent claims that plaintiffs bring with their racial harassment claims are 
informative.  Almost three-quarters of the cases include racial discrimination claims.  
This suggests that plaintiffs perceive that both hostile work environments and more 
tangible formal employer decisions occur hand-in-hand, and are racially motivated and 
discriminatory.  It portrays a very debilitating work situation for those aggrieved.  Almost 
half the cases include a retaliation claim, suggesting that plaintiffs believe that their 
complaining and the exercise of their legal rights are often met with a negative and 
retaliatory employer response. 
 
A relatively small percent of the cases had a concurrent sexual harassment claim.  
This could be because about 60% of the plaintiffs are male, and therefore less likely to 
bring sexual harassment claims.  It could also be that individuals who harass an 
individual on the basis of their race are not motivated to harass them on the basis of their 
sex.  Finally, as we noted earlier, it may be that some women plaintiffs, who are racially 
and sexually targeted are folding their racial harassment claims into their sexual 
harassment causes of action. 
 
What effect do these concurrent claims have on the outcome of the racial 
harassment claim?  The data indicates that plaintiffs who bring a concurrent racial 
discrimination claim have a significantly lower success rate in their racial harassment 
 
232 The growth in racial harassment litigation since the mid-1990s is largely attributable to Title VII cases.  
Since 1987, the number of cases based on Section 1981 or Section 1983 has been small and steady.  The 
exceptional year is 2002 in which there were a record number of these cases.  Even in that year, however, 




case.  In comparison, adding a sex discrimination claim appears to improve the plaintiffs’ 
case but adding a sexual harassment claim does not. 
 
Finally, the general growing disparity between the numbers of judicial opinions 
that are published in the Federal Reporter and those that are only electronically published 
is substantiated.  Over 60% of the cases are not published in the Federal Reporter.  Thus, 
a substantial portion of judicial reasoning and interpretation in racial harassment cases 
does not have the accessibility or the credibility of the Federal Reporter.  Moreover, 
judges, lawyers, and scholars relying only on the Federal Reporter have a distorted view 
of racial harassment law, believing that the plaintiffs’ probability of winning a lawsuit are 
higher than they actually are.  On the other hand, the higher plaintiffs’ win rate in the 
Federal Reporter offers more positive (albeit unrepresentative) precedents for plaintiffs’ 
use as authority. 
 
E.  Future of Racial Harassment Law
Racial harassment law deserves its own jurisprudence.  Although it launched 
workplace harassment doctrine through the Rogers case, the tide of legal events moved in 
the direction of sexual harassment.  For too long, it has lived in the backwaters of sexual 
harassment law with neither a clear roadmap to it nor a solid harbor to dock.  It has 
remained off the radar screen of legal scholars and consequently judges have shaped it 
haphazardly in different parts of the country. 
 
This study alters that legal geography.  It provides for the first time a 
representative summary of what actually occurs with racial harassment cases in the 
courts. It gives scholars a sound basis to create a new jurisprudence guided by 
statistically sound data.  By pointing the way to the particular case characteristics that 
affect actual outcomes, this study can help scholars in their efforts to develop “theories” 
of racial harassment. 
 
The study benefits enormously plaintiffs, defendants, their lawyers, and judges 
involved in racial harassment cases.  All parties can use its detailed baseline to compare 
their case. In addition to the traditional selective case precedent method, each party can 
now draw upon the totality of racial harassment cases to guide their decisionmaking.  For 
example, knowing the odds of winning or losing with particular claims, parties, or forums 
can help determine whether or not to use the courts.  Lawyers who have tended to see 
“harassment law” as synonymous with sexual harassment now can explore racial 
harassment as a possible avenue.  Judges in particular can benefit by examining their own 
decisionmaking against the collective judicial decisionmaking across the country.  
Hopefully, this study will encourage them to reflect on their own views and potential 
blindsides when it comes to racial harassment. 
 
Finally, legislators can use this study to guide their own efforts to end racial 
harassment in the workplace.  They can see how legislation has played out in the courts 
and decide whether their efforts are having the intended consequences.  Knowing the 
results of prior efforts enables them to craft future laws to better achieve their desired 
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end.  This study gives them a benchmark against which they can measure their progress, 
monitor the judicial branch’s rendering of their laws, and modify ongoing efforts in 
response to racial harassment cases. 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art22
